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1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION?
At the November 2018 election, Floridians successfully availed
themselves of three different ways to amend their state constitution:
changes proposed by the Legislature, by citizens' initiatives, and by a
vicennial Constitution Revision Commission.' Two methods are shared
by other states; the last method is unique to Florida. Voters approved
amendments originating from all three methods with the required sixty-
percent supermajorities. 2 Beneath this robust showing, however, is a
retreat from Florida citizens' control over their state constitution. While
the Florida initiative process has been under almost continual attack
since its first use in 1976, the 2017 Constitution Revision Commission
("CRC") suffered the first serious attempts to attack its work when
several suits were filed to strike its amendments from the ballot in 2018.3
The Florida Supreme Court intervened to review all of the CRC's
proposed amendments and removed one amendment from the voters.4
Constitutional conventions have existed in North America since
before the colonies prevailed in their bid for independence from Britain.5
1. See Initiatives/Amendments/Revisions, FLA. DIVIsION ELECTIONS, https://
dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/ (last visited May 23, 2019).
2. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(e).
3. See discussion infra Section III.D.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 311-17.
5. See, e.g., George Justice, Constitutional Convention, NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https:/
/www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/constitutional-conventions (last
updated June 6, 2017); Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://
www.encyclopedia.com/law/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/massachusetts-c
onstitution-1780 (last updated Oct. 25, 2019); Schaffer Law Library's Guide on the New York
State Constitution, ALB. L. SCH., https://www.albanylaw.edulmedialuser/librarypdfs/guides/
nyconsti.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2019).
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Nearly every state has experienced at least one convention, and most
state constitutions provide for a constitutional convention to be called
under defined circumstances.6 One example, found in several states, is a
timed question at the ballot: if a legislature has not proposed a
constitutional convention for a defined number of years, commonly ten,
then the Secretary of State must place on the ballot at a general election
the question of whether to hold a constitutional convention.7 If the people
vote yes, the state must, on paper at least, hold a convention.8 And when
one hears the term constitutional convention, one has an idea of what is
meant: a gathering of many people, perhaps hundreds, who have been
chosen by the citizens through some formal process and are charged with
writing-or extensively rewriting-a constitution.
Similarly, citizens' initiatives are familiar to citizens of the eighteen
states that provide them as a method of amending that state's
constitution.9 Regardless of whether a citizen lives in a state that
provides for constitutional amendment by initiative, she probably has
read or heard about initiatives in the news. For example, California's
Proposition 13, a 1978 citizen-propelled measure to limit property
taxation, was perhaps the first nationally known initiative. 10 Citizens'
initiatives are typically single-subject proposals to amend a state
constitution (or, more rarely, create a new statute). 1 In most states, an
initiative must be supported by petition signatures equal to a stated
percentage of the state's population or of the number of votes at the last
6. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, BOOK OF THE STATES 10 tbl.1.5 (2018), http://
knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/1.5.2018.pdf.
7. Id. States with ten-year triggers for conventions are Alaska, Hawai'i, Iowa, New
Hampshire, and Rhode Island. Id. States with twenty-year triggers for conventions are
Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New York, Ohio, and Oklahoma. Id.
8. Id. At least one state refused to follow the mandate in recent years: Oklahoma's
Legislature has refused to allow the question of a constitutional convention to be placed on
the ballot since 1970. John Dinan, State Constitutional Amendments and American
Constitutionalism, 41 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 27, 33 (2016). Its constitution calls for the
question to be placed on the ballot every twenty years. Id.
9. COUNcIL OF STATE GOV'TS, BOOK OF THE STATES 9 tbl.1.4 (2018), http://
knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/1.4.2018.pdf.
10. See What Is Proposition 13?, CAL. TAX DATA, https://www.californiataxdata.com/
pdflPropl3.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2019); see also, e.g., Tugend Alina, The Least




11. See, e.g., Initiative, FREE DICTIONARY BY FARLAX, https://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Citizen+initiative (last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
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general election. Although the effort required to meet the signature
requirement means an initiative must be well-funded, the fact that
initiatives reach the ballot only by garnering a large number of
signatures of voters makes them an example of direct democracy.
The rise of citizens' initiatives in the twentieth century to amend both
state constitutions and statute books has been ably documented
elsewhere. 12 It is debatable whether the creators of citizens' initiatives
foresaw what rapidly became the norm: to get an initiative on the ballot,
a sponsor had to get signatures equal to a percentage of the state's
population-in effect, many thousands of signatures--on a petition. 13
And to get signatures in those numbers, the sponsor had to be able to pay
people to solicit signatures. Add to this cost the fees of an attorney
knowledgeable enough to word the proposed initiative in a way that
would satisfy the state's single-subject and ballot-summary require-
ments.14 The result: "citizens"' initiatives have become increasingly,
instead, millionaire citizens' initiatives. While this ability to shape a
state's fundamental organizing document has been popular with citizens,
it has not resulted in comprehensive constitutional reform: any single
initiative cannot, by definition, revise an entire portion of a constitution.
But between the necessarily piecemeal approach of citizens'
initiatives and the comprehensive nature of a convention lies a less-
familiar third alternative: the constitution revision commission. Most
commissions are created by statute or executive order; few may be
provided for in state constitutions themselves.1 5 In most cases,
constitution revision commissions are convened for a particular purpose,
such as to prepare for a scheduled call for a state constitutional
convention, to consider changes after a question to form a constitutional
convention has been rejected, or to consider changes after voters have
rejected proposals referred by a constitutional convention.16 In all states
but one that have them, constitution revision commissions must refer
12. See, e.g., Thomas Gais & Gerald Benjamin, Public Discontent and the Decline of
Deliberation: A Dilemma in State Constitutional Reform, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1291, 1299-1300
(1995); Marvin Krislov & Daniel M. Katz, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 17
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 295, 304 (2008); Robert F. Williams, Evolving State
Constitutional Processes of Adoption, Revision, and Amendment: The Path Ahead, 69 ARK.
L. REV. 553, 574 (2016).
13. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 9, at 9 tbl.1.4.
14. See, e.g., infra note 250.
15. See Robert F. Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions Things of the Past?
The Increasing Role of the Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional Change, 1
HOFSTRA L. & POLY SYMP. 1, 6 (1996).
16. See id. at 3-4.
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their proposals to the state legislature;17 the exception is Florida, where
the constitution revision commission is empowered to put its proposals
directly to the people. 18 In fact, Florida has not one, but two regularly
recurring constitution revision commissions with this power: the Florida
Constitution Revision Commission (CRC), original to the 1968
constitution, meets every twenty years beginning in 1977 and most
recently meeting in 2017-18; and the other, the Tax and Budget Reform
Commission (TBRC), itself created by a constitutional amendment,
meets every twenty years in the decades in which the CRC does not
meet. 19 The TBRC may propose revisions only to parts of the constitution
"dealing with taxation or the state budgetary process." 20
Thus, constitution revision commissions occupy a middle ground
between what might be termed passing popular passions-individual
changes that can be dealt with as a citizens' initiative-and total
constitutional redrafting, when a constitutional convention is called for.
In his 1996 Hofstra Law & Policy Symposium article, Professor
Robert Williams argues that constitution revision commissions have
begun to overtake constitutional conventions as methods of effecting
comprehensive constitutional change at the state level.2 1 At the end of
his article Williams raises several questions, some of which I attempt to
answer in this article. His final two questions, in particular, bear analysis
now, more than two decades later. They are: "How do we measure the
success of state constitutional commissions. . . ?" and "Are commissions
utilized ... more for amendments rather than for wholesale revisions?"22
In attempting to answer Williams's questions, this Article will address
how Florida's experiences with its plenary-empowered CRC can shed
light for residents and leaders in other states on the opportunities and
the pitfalls of a state constitution revision commission.
17. See Williams, supra note 12, at 571.
18. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
19. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 6.
20. Id.
21. Williams, supra note 15, at 4.
22. Id. at 25.
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II. THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION
A. Hybrid Design
The composition of Florida's Constitution Revision Commission, with
members appointed by the heads of the branches of government, implies
that it was designed to be a representative, deliberative body. However,
it has an element of direct democracy in that its proposals go straight to
the voters without legislative or executive approval. Even so, its
constitutional framework is scant. It consists of the Florida Attorney
General as an automatic member and thirty-six appointed members. 23
The Governor appoints fifteen members, one of which he designates as
chair; the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House each
appoint nine members; and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
appoints just three members, and must do so "with the advice of the
justices." 24 No restrictions are placed on who may be appointed.25 For
example, the legislative leaders are neither forced to appoint, nor
prohibited from appointing, legislators, and appointing authorities may
appoint themselves. In fact, the constitution requires no qualifications at
all for appointees to the CRC.
The CRC is designed to be deliberative because its members are
collectively required to fulfill the CRC's constitutional obligations. The
CRC is required to do only a few things: convene at the call of the chair;
make its own rules; hold public hearings; review the constitution; decide
what, if any, changes to propose; and send those proposed changes to the
"custodian of state records" at least 180 days before the next general
election. 26 The constitution contains no provision for judicial oversight of
the CRC's work.27
But in addition to being representative and deliberative, the CRC
adds a fillip of direct democracy: its proposals "shall be submitted to the
electors."28 No stopping by the Legislature or the Governor's Office for
approval. And, until 2018, there had been no stopping by the courthouse
either.29 The CRC instead has relied on the trust of the voters to approve
necessary changes and block unfavorable amendments. Thus, Florida's
CRC partakes in both the "filter" view of constitutional change and the





28. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 232-34.
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"mirror" view, as James S. Fishkin describes them.30 James Madison
supported the filter view of legal change, in which representatives "refine
and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens."31 The result, Madison argued, could be that "the
public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be
more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people
themselves, if convened for the purpose." 32 The mirror view, on the other
hand, as advocated by John Adams, held that a body of representatives
should be "in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large."33
Florida's CRC, with its elements of both filtration, through appointed
representatives, and mirroring, through allowing ordinary citizens to be
members and presenting proposals directly to the people, attempts to
blend-or straddle-both.
In addition to its broad mandate to consider and potentially revise
the entire constitution, Florida's CRC does share, loosely, one more trait
with the constitutional conventions of its sibling states: its periodic
appearance on the ballot. 34 As do fourteen other states, Florida mandates
the periodic appearance on the ballot of the question of constitution
revision. 35 The difference is that the fourteen other states mandate a vote
on the question of whether to have the revision, and in every other state
the form of revision is a constitutional convention. 36 As Professor John
Dinan notes, mandatory convention calls are the most useful tool for
achieving comprehensive amendments. 37 The Florida CRC is unique in
that it must occur and is not contingent upon a legislature deciding
whether to call it into being, as in states such as Wisconsin and
30. James S. Fishkin, Beyond Referendum Democracy: Competing Conceptions of Public
Opinion, in DEMOCRACY: How DIRECT?: VIEWS FROM THE FOUNDING ERA AND THE POLLING
ERA, 53, 55-58 (Elliott Abrams ed., 2002); see also In re Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re: Limits
or Prevents Barriers to Local Solar Elec. Supply, 177 So. 3d 235, 242 (Fla. 2015) (noting the
CRC has a filtering process).
31. Fishkin, supra note 30, at 55.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 56.
34. See Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Is Constitutional Revision Success Worth Its
Popular Sovereignty Price?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 249, 252-53 (2000).
35. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 6.
36. Id. These states are Alaska, Connecticut, Hawai'i, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Rhode
Island. Id.
37. John Dinan, The Political Dynamics of Mandatory State Constitutional Convention
Referendums: Lessons from the 2000s Regarding Obstacles and Pathways to Their Passage,
71 MONT. L. REV. 395, 395 (2010); see also Dinan, supra note 8.
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California, or a vote by the electorate on whether to call it, as in states
such as Michigan and Ohio.38 Professor Dinan observed that a group of
states held conventions between 1971 and 1992, including four automatic
convention ballot referrals, which enacted "notable reforms."3 9 Since
1992, however, no voters in a state with automatic convention referrals
have approved calling a convention. 40 New York is the most recent state,
having had a convention question placed on the ballot in 2017.41 New
York voters remained highly allergic to a convention, with eighty-three
percent voting against the ballot proposal, embodying what could be
called a national "fear of filing." 42
At its inception in 1968, the Florida Constitution provided that the
CRC meet ten years after the constitution was adopted and every twenty
years thereafter; 43 therefore, it met in 1977-78, 1997-98, and 2017-18.
This constitutionally provided schedule demonstrates that the Florida
CRC is not the subject of a popular vote as to whether it should meet
every twenty years; instead, it does meet, and Florida's citizens accept or
reject, more or less piecemeal, its proposals.
The structure of the Florida CRC reflects a composite of trends for
amending state constitutions. Although created before citizens'
assemblies became voguish, it shares similar features: like a citizens'
assembly, the Florida CRC is a small subset of the larger population
which deliberates on an issue and makes recommended changes directly
to the voters." Unlike recent citizens' assemblies, its members are
selected by certain public officials instead of randomly, and the remit of
38. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, supra note 6.
39. Dinan, supra note 37, at 396-97.
40. See Vladimir Kogan, The Irony of Comprehensive State Constitutional Reform, 41
RUTGERS L.J. 881, 892 (2010).
41. John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2017, CSG KNOWLEDGE CTR.
(Aug. 9, 2018, 12:45 PM), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/state-constitutional-
developments-2017.
42. Id. See generally ERICA JONG, FEAR OF FLYING (1973) (detailing the protagonist's
fear of living outside the shackles of traditional male companionship).
43. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
44. See Michael Pal, The Promise and Limits of Citizens' Assemblies: Deliberation,
Institutions and the Law of Democracy, 38 QUEEN'S L.J. 259, 259 (2012); see also Kevin
O'Leary, The Citizen Assembly: An Alternative to the Initiative, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1489,
1497-98 (2007) (contrasting citizens' assemblies with representative government); Note,
Making Ballot Initiatives Work: Some Assembly Required, 123 HARV. L. REV. 959, 962-63
(2010) (describing the British Columbia citizens' assembly charged with developing ballot
initiatives).
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the Florida CRC is the entire state constitution as opposed to a single
problem.4 5
The CRC is also like a convention as it has plenary authority to
recommend revisions for the whole constitution "or any part of it."46 Its
operation is similar in some respects to conventional CRCs and
constitutional conventions in that its work is designed to be deliberative,
to a point. After all, the fact that decisions within the CRC have always
been made by voting means that deliberations cease when voting
begins.47 As Michael Pal has written, "Voting is, of course, an aggregative
rather than deliberative decision-making procedure." 48 That aggregative
process continues when, also as in a convention, the Florida CRC's
recommendations are put directly to the public for a vote. 49
There are differences, however. A plenary convention, in Florida as
in most other states, can be called at any time, while the CRC is
programmed on a twenty-year repetition.5 0 Delegates to the plenary
convention are elected, while CRC commissioners are appointed.51 There
is a prolonged cooling-off period before and after a plenary convention as
provided in Florida's constitution; the period between the ballot question
of whether to hold a convention and the submission by the convention
members of their proposals is four years (three separate general
elections).52 The CRC, in contrast, operates on a faster timeline to
complete its work and have it voted upon: its members must be named,
thus "establish[ing]" it, within thirty days before the Legislature
convenes for its regular session in early spring, in an odd-numbered, non-
election year. 53 The CRC must also have its proposals ready for the ballot
45. See generally Pal, supra note 44, at 260 (examining the role of citizens' assemblies
in enacting electoral reform in British Columbia and Ontario).
46. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
47. Cf. FLA. CONSTITUTION REVISION COMM'N 2017-18 RULES § 1.17, https://
crc.law.fsu.edulPublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/Rules.pdf (descri-
bing CRC voting obligations); FLA. CONSTITUTION REVISION COMM'N 1997-98 RULES § 1.17
(same); see also Transcript of Proceedings at 188, Const. Revision Comm'n (Sept. 27, 1977).
48. Pal, supra note 44, at 267.
49. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(c).
50. Compare FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 4, with FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
51. Compare FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 4(b), with FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(a)-(b).
52. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
53. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(a). Before 1998, the CRC was to be called within thirty days
after the Legislature convened. See Miscellaneous Matters and Technical Revisions, FLA.
DIVISION ELECTIONS, https://dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/initdetail.asp?account
=11&seqnum=9 (last visited July 1, 2019). The 1998 CRC amended this timeline to allow
the CRC to have additional time to complete its work before its deadline. Id.
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180 days before the next general election.54 This makes for an
approximately fourteen-month timeline.
B. History
The Florida CRC originated as a reaction against legislative
intransigence.5 5 The state legislatures of all fifty states were
malapportioned prior to 1962.56 Florida had no semblance of "one-person-
one-vote." 57 Its apportionment scheme was ossified into its constitution
so that any meaningful legislative reapportionment would have to come
as a result of constitutional change.5 8 That change faced formidable
resistance from the legislators already occupying the malapportioned
seats, a group popularly called the ' Pork Chop Gang.59 The mal-
apportionment had started as accurate apportionment under the
population patterns in Florida at the time of the adoption of its most
recent constitution: 1885. At that time, most Floridians lived within fifty
miles of Georgia or Alabama, and the peninsula was thinly inhabited. 60
By the time Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims were decided, however,
the population center had long ago shifted to central and south Florida,
without the apportionment scheme having changed significantly.61 The
Florida Constitution contained rigid rules for how many legislators a
county could have, 62 and the many rural counties of the north and the
fewer, but urbanized counties of the south ensured that most legislators
lived in North Florida and had constituencies of just several thousand.
In 1955, for example, it took only about one-seventh of the voters to elect
a majority in both houses of the Florida Legislature. 63 The legislators
54. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(c).
55. See Williams, supra note 34, at 255-56.
56. See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY:
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 26-27 (2008).
57. Williams, supra note 34, at 255-56.
58. See FLA CONST. art. VII §§ 2-4 (repealed 1968).
59. See DAVID R. COLBURN & LANCE DEHAVEN-SMITH, GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE
STATE: FLORIDA SINCE STATEHOOD 38 (1999).
60. Cf. 1880 Census - Florida, CENSUS ONLINE, http://census-online.com/links/FL/
1880.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).
61. 377 U.S. 533 (1964); 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see also Florida Census; 1960, FIA. CTR.
FOR INSTRUCTIONAL TECH., http://fcit.usf.edulflorida/docs/c/census/1960.htm (last visited
Sept. 25, 2019).
62. FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 3-4.
63. MARY E. ADKINS, MAKING MODERN FLORIDA: HOW THE SPIRIT OF REFORM SHAPED
A NEW STATE CONSTITUTION 33 (2016); see also William C. Havard & Loren P. Beth,
Representative Government and Reapportionment: A Case Study of Florida, in
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representing Tampa, Miami, and Fort Lauderdale represented as many
as 300,000 constituents. 64 Thus, metropolitan areas such as Tampa,
Miami, and Fort Lauderdale had only one vote apiece in, for example, the
1963 Senate.65
Then came the apportionment decisions from the Supreme Court of
the United States. First, Baker v. Carr allowed federal courts to involve
themselves in state legislative districting; 66 and second, Reynolds v. Sims
set the standard for state legislatures to apportion themselves in equal-
districts to achieve the goal of "one person, one vote."6 7 One person, one
vote meant trouble for the Pork Chop Gang.
Every state reapportioned within new constitutional limits between
1962 and 1967 following the Baker and Reynolds decisions. 68 As we shall
see, Florida was among the last. Three years after Baker, Florida's own
federal reapportionment case, Swann v. Adams, had forced just enough
"creeping reapportionment," as one Speaker of the House put it, to get
enough votes to pass a bill creating a Constitution Revision
Commission.69 The bill passed in 1965.70 This Commission would consist
of thirty-seven members appointed by the heads of each of the three
branches of the government-the Governor, the Senate President, the
House Speaker, and the Chief Justice-plus appointees by the President
of the state bar. 71 The Attorney General would be a member
automatically.72 This Commission, like most around the nation, would
have power only to suggest constitutional changes to the Legislature. 73
REAPPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATION IN FLORIDA: A HISTORICAL COLLECTION 76
fig.2.6-2.7 (MacManus ed., 1992).
64. Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316, 320 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
65. Id. at 323.
66. 369 U.S. 186, 197-98 (1962).
67. 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).
68. ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 56, at 187.
69. 378 U.S. 553, 553 (1964) (per curiam); Telephone Interview with Ralph Turlington,
Former Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives (June 13, 2014).
70. See 1965 Fla. Laws 1776.
71. Id. at 1776-77.
72. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(a)(1).
73. 1965 Fla. Laws 1776; see also Williams, supra note 12, at 570. A similar commission
had been appointed ten years earlier, in 1955. ADKINS, supra note 63, at 22. The Florida
Constitution Advisory Committee ("FCAC") also had thirty-seven members and was asked
to consider a new constitution. Id. The FCAC was created by the Legislature at the request
of reformist Governor LeRoy Collins. Id. at 20-22. Having created it, the Legislature felt
free to ignore its recommendations. Id. 22-24. Baker v. Carr had not yet put the "fear of
God" into the Legislature.
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The 1965-67 CRC proposed a complete overhaul of Florida's
constitution, which the newly apportioned, much younger, and much
more urban Legislature proposed to the voters in 1968, changing
everything but the judicial article. 74 The near-complete amendment of
Florida's constitution in 1968 was, strictly speaking, not the result of a
convention but of the legislatively created CRC.
The 1965 CRC proposed a constitutionally based, recurring CRC and
a citizens' initiative process as new methods of amendment. That CRC,
still in place today, was intended to be independent of political pressures
by consisting of appointees who, because the CRC would not recur for
twenty years, had no need to worry about losing their seat as a result of
voting their conscience in CRC work. CRC Chair Chesterfield Smith
unambiguously urged the group, during its 1966 debates, to create a CRC
entrenched in the constitution and separate from the Legislature: "the
purpose of it is to eliminate the Legislature from the process, because the
Legislature over the past 20 years has had the right to do something
about the constitutional conventions, but because it was malapportioned,
it refused to do so, and this [CRC] would permit people to act without
legislative action." 75
In January 1967, when the CRC's draft constitution was about to be
taken up for consideration at a legislative special session, Chairman
Smith addressed a joint session of the Legislature on adopting the CRC
proposals, stating:
As an individual, and as your agent, who was directed by you to
make this study, I have concluded that the single most important
thing that this historic Legislature can do-is to give to the
people forevermore the .power to amend and revise their
constitution in the future without the interference of the
Legislature, or without the interference or the veto of the Chief
Executive. The people themselves, should have the right to
initiate changes in their constitution in the future if they want to
74. See H. JOURNAL, Special Sess., at 89-99, 101-02 (Fla. 1968).
75. Transcript of Proceedings at 180-81, Const. Revision Comm'n (Dec. 15, 1966) (on
file with State Archives of Florida). Smith was pithier twenty years later while testifying
at the Robert Bork confirmation hearings before the national Senate Judiciary Committee:
"[T]hat's the exact crap that I used to hear from those people up in North Florida that had
their hands on the throat of the people." Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Assoc. Justice
of the Supreme Court of the U.S.: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. 2302 (1987).
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do so. If no other thing is achieved here, that, in and of itself,
justifies a complete constitutional revision.76
Twenty-one months later, when campaigning for the adoption of the
Legislature's final proposed constitution, Smith said during a televised
speech:
It is my own personal judgment that above all other matters, the
new provisions in the 1968 Constitution authorizing means for
further constitutional changes are the most important things in
the new constitution. It gives to the people forevermore the power
to amend and revise their constitution without the interference
of the Legislature, or without the interference or the veto of the
Chief Executive. The people themselves will have the right to
initiate changes in their constitution if they want to do so, and
the Legislature cannot stop them. If no other thing is achieved by
the new constitution, that in and of itself justifies its adoption.77
Again:
I reiterate then that the most important things in this modern
constitution are the provisions which insure that neither the
Legislature nor the Executive will ever in the future be allowed
to block constitutional amendment or constitutional revision. The
people must be the great repository of power to change the
constitution. This is achieved in the new constitution, and that
fact alone justifies the work which has been done over the past
few years.7 8
That CRC was eventually successful in getting its proposed
constitution through the Legislature,7 9 but perhaps only because the very
day the Legislature was supposed to take up its recommendations, in fact
while Smith was addressing the Legislature, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down Florida's latest legislative apportionment scheme.8 0
76. H. JOURNAL, Extraordinary Sess., at 21 (Fla. 1967).
77. Chesterfield Smith, Chairman, Constitution Revision Comm'n, Speech televised by
University of Florida Television, Gainesville, Florida, 18 (Oct. 24, 1968) (transcript on file
with University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries).
78. Id. at 18-19.
79. H. JOURNAL, Special Sess., at 89 (Fla. 1968).
80. Swann v. Adams, 385 US. 440, 443-44 (1967).
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Although that scheme had already created the most geographically and
politically diverse Legislature Florida had seen since Reconstruction, it
was not good enough for the Supreme Court. The Legislature that had
planned to work on the proposed constitution had to disband.8 1
When the Legislature next met, it was composed of persons elected
under a scheme created by a University of Florida political science
professor whose plan, which he had submitted to the court as an amicus
curia, the court adopted as satisfying its one-person, one-vote standard. 82
Thus Florida's new constitution, drafted by reformers, was submitted to
a reformed Legislature. That reformed Legislature tweaked it and placed
it on the ballot. 83 Florida's swiftly growing, swiftly urbanizing
population-a population that was working to put astronauts on the
moon and build Disney's eastern theme park near Orlando-adopted the
new constitution. 84
The Florida Legislature that received the CRC proposals did not alter
the CRC and initiative proposals other than to slant future CRC
appointees to the House and Senate.85 The citizens' initiative provision
passed through the Legislature largely unchanged.8 6 The voters
approved both processes along with the rest of the proposed new Florida
Constitution; 87 Florida adopted its new constitution in the general
election of 1968, one of several states that did so in the decade after Baker
v. Carr.
The 1965 CRC and 1967-68 Legislature unquestionably reflected the
views of a new generation who had chafed under Florida's antiquated
political system. Florida's population had exploded following World War
II, and rapid urbanization in southeast Florida required greater local
control of local issues.8 8 The constitutionally based, automatically
recurring CRC was intended to permit, therefore, a. generational
81. See ADKINS, supra note 63, at 156-57.
82. See Petition of Manning J. Dauer as Amici Curiae Supporting Himself, Swann v.
Adams, 258 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Fla. 1965) (Civ. No. 186-62) (on file with University of
Florida George A. Smathers Libraries).
83. H. JOURNAL, Special Sess., at 89-99 (Fla. 1968).
84. See ADKINS, supra note 63, at 178-80.
85. See H. JOURNAL, Extraordinary Sess., at 15 (Fla. 1967).
86. H. JOURNAL, Extraordinary Sess., at 21 (Fla. 1967); FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
87. Florida Constitutional Basic Document, Amendment 1 (1968), BALLOTPEDIA, https:/
/ballotpedia.org/FloridaConstitutionalBasicDocument,_Amendment_1_(1968) (last visi-
ted Oct. 3, 2019).
88. See Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 1990, U.S. BUREAU CENSUS
(Mar. 27, 1995), https://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/fl190090.txt (stating the
population of Florida went from 1,897,414 in 1940 to 4,951,560 in 1960).
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adjustment for the rapidly changing state. Florida's constitution was
intended to not be static.
The modern birth of the idea of a fixed, recurring constitutional
review occurred within feverish discussions in Paris in the winter of
1788-89. A French "Society of Thirty" began work on a written
constitution including a declaration of rights.8 9 One member of the
Society, Marquis de Lafayette, began secretly drafting a declaration of
rights beginning in January of 1789 which he shared with his American
friend Thomas Jefferson, then the United States Minister to France, for
the purpose of getting Jefferson's advice.90 Jefferson sent this draft and
other materials to his friend James Madison, in an electrified letter dated
September 6, 1789, as information on the United States' effort to draft a
bill of rights.91 Jefferson had been absent from the United States during
its 1787 constitutional convention and was struck that neither the United
States Constitution nor those under discussion by the Society of Thirty
contained provisions restricting the extent to which one generation could
bind another, especially in allowing generational review of its
constitution or limiting public debt to be paid by future generations. 92
The editor of Jefferson's papers states that this letter "stands apart" from
all others in the extensive correspondence between Jefferson and
Madison in that Jefferson is speaking more theoretically than
practically-especially as the United States Constitution was already
written and ratified and, of course, contained no provision for regular
review.9 3
The September 1789 letter challenges the authority by which one
generation binds the fundamental right of a later generation to change
its government or immerse it in debt.9 4 Jefferson analogized it to the legal
ban on perpetual entailments of property.95 Significantly, Jefferson
concluded that a guarantee of periodic constitutional review was
89. Daniel Wick, The Court Nobility and the French Revolution: The Example of the
Society of Thirty, 13 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 263, 263-64, 264 n.4 (1980).
90. WILLIAM HOWARD ADAMS, THE PARIS YEARS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 269-71 (1997);
see also ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 62-91
(1964) (noting possible contribution by Thomas Paine, who met with Jefferson in Paris).
91. See Thomas Jefferson, September 6, 1789 Letter to James Madison, in 15 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392-97 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
92. Id. at 392.
93. Julian P. Boyd, Editorial Note to The Earth Belongs in Usufruct to the Living, in 15
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 384, 387 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
94. Jefferson, supra note 91, at 392-93.
95. Id. at 396-97.
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necessary to protect the natural right of self-government, which a prior
generation could not bind:
[I]t may be proved that no society can make a perpetual
constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always
to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what
proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct.. . . Every
constitution then, and every law, naturally expires at the end of
19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force, and not of
right.96
Jefferson concluded that a voluntary call for a convention to repeal
prior constitutional provisions would be insufficient; a fixed mechanism
was required.9 7 His reason:
The people cannot assemble themselves. Their representation is
unequal and vicious. Various checks are opposed to every
legislative proposition. Factions get possession of the public
councils. Bribery corrupts them. Personal interests lead them
astray from the general interests of their constituents: and other
impediments arise so as to prove to every practical man that a
law of limited duration is much more manageable than one which
needs a repeal. 98
Jefferson would remain committed to this idea through his life.99
Lafayette was not as enthusiastic about the automatic revision proposal
as Jefferson but left a general provision in an intermediate draft.100 The
provision was later removed when Lafayette's draft Declaration of Rights
met immediate resistance by conservative delegates in the French
National Assembly. 10 1 Events immediately overtook this draft and it was
never seriously considered: street violence started in Paris, assembly
96. Id. at 396 (using mortality tables to hypothesize the political lifespan of one
generation to be nineteen years).
97. Id. at 395.
98. Id.
99. Boyd, supra note 93, at 384; see also Williams, supra note 15, at 3 (quoting Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS 1395, 1402 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984)).
100. 2 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 224 (1951).
101. ADAMS, supra note 90, at 293.
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delegates were sidetracked, and when discussion of the constitution
resumed weeks later, political opinions had hardened. 102
In Florida, no overt indication has been found that the 1966 CRC
relied on Jefferson in proposing the mandatory twenty-year review by the
CRC. A constitution review committee that convened at the call of
Governor LeRoy Collins in 1958 considered a twenty-year review as well,
but its recommendations died in the next legislative session. 103 However,
Chairman Smith addressed the 1967 joint Legislature on this point as it
took up his group's proposed constitution.1 04 Smith did stress the
Jeffersonian theme that the future is unknowable as reason to not bind
a constitution:
As you face this historic task of drafting a new constitution, I
suggest that the most difficult thing that you will have to do is to
face up to the reality that someone else besides you has
intelligence. Legislators of twenty and thirty years from now
should be granted the flexibility to meet problems as they then
exist without a present restriction imposed by you. If you
determine something is needed now, it is not necessary that you
also determine that it will be needed forevermore.10 5
C. The Promise of Comprehensive Reform
Florida's CRC was conceived to allow for comprehensive reform; it is
not restricted by single-subject requirements, as citizens' initiatives
are.106 And logically, its place in Florida's unusually broad array of tools
102. LAURA AURICCHIO, THE MARQUIS: LAFAYETTE RECONSIDERED 182-83 (2014);
JONATHAN ISRAEL, REVOLUTIONARY IDEAS: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION FROM THE RIGHTS OF MAN TO ROBESPIERRE 77-85 (2014) (discussing Assembly
Committee debates); see also ADAMS, supra note 90, at 286 ("On the morning of July 11
Lafayette laid the draft of his declaration on the assembly desk. His timing could not have
been worse.").
103. Letter from Maxine Baker, Member, Special Constitutional Advisory Comm., to
Van Gill and Frances Kilroe, Members, League of Women Voters (Nov. 21, 1958) (on file
with the University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries).
104. H.R. JOURNAL, 41st Leg., at 21 (Fla. 1967) (statement of Rep. Smith).
105. Id.
106. In the 2019 Florida legislative session, proposed constitutional amendments were
considered that would have imposed a single-subject restriction on CRC proposals. See
H.R.J. Res. 53, 2019 Leg. (Fla. 2019); S.J. Res. 74, 2019 Leg. (Fla. 2019); S.J. Res. 86, 2019
Leg. (Fla. 2019). Another amendment proposed by the Legislature would have abolished
the CRC altogether. H.R.J. Res. 249, 2019 Leg. (Fla. 2019). Both failed. However, another
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for constitutional change lies between the prospect of complete revision
in a constitutional convention and piecemeal amendment in a citizens'
initiative. Chairman Smith's statements about the CRC's purpose
confirm its purpose. In theory then, Florida's CRC is in a position to make
comprehensive reforms that the people want and that the Legislature
may not want. For example, the CRC might be able to place a set of strong
environmental protections into the constitution, free .of the powers of
special interests. Or the CRC, with voters' support, might be able to
respond to popular issues such as gun safety by amending the
constitution, free of the force of the National Rifle Association lobby.
But has it worked out that way? Has the CRC fulfilled its ability to
offer comprehensive reform, rather than piecemeal amendments? And
has its power to bypass the Legislature resulted in a strong example of
direct democracy?
For the. most part, the answer is no. Even though supposedly free of
political pressure, CRCs have accomplished little comprehensive reform
and the most recent CRC was no exception. A former CRC Chair, Talbot
"Sandy" D'Alemberte, wrote an open. letter recommending comp-
rehensive cleanup of noncontroversial provisions prior to the 2017
CRC.107 For example, the Florida Constitution still purports to impose
term limits on federal senators and members of Congress and to
recognize marriages occurring only between a man and a woman. 108 Both
of these provisions had been ruled unconstitutional under the Federal
Constitution. 109 The 2017 CRC ignored public recommendations to
remove these two provisions, 110 leaving these clauses perhaps as marks
of defiance, much as Florida had refused to remove its constitutional ban
on integrated schools until 1968, well after the 1954 Brown v. Board of
passed that restricts the signature-collection requirements on citizens' initiatives. H.B. 5,
2019 Leg., 2019 Fla. Laws c. 64.
107. Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, Time for Spring Cleaning for the Florida Constitution,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Oct. 11, 2016, 2:56 PM), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/
opinion/2016/10/1 1/time-spring-cleaning-florida-constitution/91905728/.
108. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b)(5)-(6); id. art. I, § 27.
109. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015); United States Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
110. See Public Proposals - Website Submissions, FLA. ST. U.: CONST. REVISION
COMMISSION, https://crc.law.fsu.edulPublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIO
NS/CRCPublicProposals.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) (listing for CRC's consideration
public proposal 700046, regarding election of U.S. Senators and Representatives, and public
proposal 700118, regarding elimination of definition of marriage).
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Education ruling.111 The 2017-18 CRC disregarded most clean-up
recommendations.
But it must be said that the 2017-18 was actively discouraged from
the efforts it did make at comprehensive changes. Section III discusses
some of the challenges Florida's CRCs have faced, which a CRC or
convention from any state could face, if not alert to the pitfalls.
Subsection A explains why the structure of the CRC steps on its own feet
by discouraging the comprehensive change it appears to enable.
Subsection B describes in detail how that structure has affected the work
of the CRCs, with detailed examples from the most recent CRC. Finally,
Subsection C suggests changes for greater effectiveness of CRCs in
Florida and other states.
III. CHALLENGES FACED BY CRCs
A. CRC Structure: Divided Priorities
1. Selection of Members
Although the CRC sends its proposals directly to the voters, most of
its members do not come directly from the voters. The exception is the
Attorney General, a position that, in Florida, is elected on a partisan
basis. 112 The selection of the other members, however, is once, twice, or
three times removed from the public vote. The Governor's appointees are
selected by a popularly elected governor, thus being just once removed
from popular election.11 3 The eighteen combined appointments by
legislative leadership are twice removed: the public elect legislators, then
those legislators choose their leaders-the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate-and those leaders appoint nine CRC members
each. 114 The Chief Justice is appointed as a Justice by the Governor, after
first being nominated by a Judicial Nominating Commission. 115 The
111. See Florida's Constitutions: The Documentary History, FLA. ST. U.: FLA. CONST.
REVISION COMMISSION, https://fall.fsulawre.com/crc/conhist/contents.html (last visited
Sept. 29, 2019) (indicating all amendments to the Florida Constitution of 1885, with no
proposed amendment to Article XII, Section 12, which required racial segregation of public
schools).
112. See generally FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5. In practice all Florida cabinet positions, of
which the Attorney General is one under this article, are elected on a partisan basis.
113. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(a)(2).
114. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(a)(3).
115. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11(a).
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seven justices elect their Chief on a two-year rotating basis. 116 Thus, the
three CRC members appointed by the Chief Justice are thrice removed
from the elective process: voters elect the Governor, who selects the
Justice, who is elected Chief.117 Thus, this process contrasts with the
representative democratic notion that CRC members are accountable to
the people. 118
CRC members are not, in their CRC role, employees of their
appointer. CRC members are not paid; there is no promotion for which
CRC members can become eligible based on their performance in the
CRC. Siffiilarly, CRC members cannot be fired by their appointer for any
decision made in their CRC role. Appointees have no constituency, in
contrast to a local legislator representing a district, so they are free to act
on behalf of the whole state. CRC members do not face election or
reelection to the CRC, so they have no fundraising duties and are
therefore immune from lobbyists with the power to fund or defund
election campaigns.
Another way in which the structure of the CRC is not designed to
form a true representative body is that no requirements exist to qualify
for CRC membership, and no provision exists to coordinate choices
among the appointing authorities. For the 1977-78 CRC, the Governor's
staff coordinated informally with the staff of the legislative leadership to
ensure the appointers would not overlap appointees, but that was
voluntary as it is not mentioned in the constitution.'1 9 For the 1997-98
and 2017-18 CRCs, appointers used applications for people interested in
a CRC appointment. 120
One result of having no particular requirements for members has
been a lack of geographic diversity. Six of the thirty-seven 2017-18
members lived in the state capital of Tallahassee, a city with a population
of less than 200,000.121 Miami-Dade County, which has a population of
116. FLA. SUPREME COURT, THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA MANUAL OF INTERNAL
OPERATING PROCEDURES §1(B) (2016).
117. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(a)(4).
118. Pal, supra note 44, at 266.
119. Interview with James Apthorp, Staff, Gov. Reubin O'D. Askew, Member,
Constitution Revision Comm'n 1977-78, in Tallahassee, Fla. (July 23, 2015).
120. See Mary Ellen Klas, Want a Chance to Shape Florida's Future? Applications
Accepted, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-
government/state-politics/articlel27506539.html.
121. Commissioners, CONST. REVISION COMMISSION 2017-18, http://crc.law.fsu.edul
Commissioners.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2019); see also QuickFacts: Tallahassee City,
Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/tallahassee
cityfloridafPOP010210 (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
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nearly 2.5 million, also had six members. 122 The Senate President, who
was from Martin County, with a population of less than 150,000, chose
three of his nine appointees from among Martin County citizens.123
Jacksonville, which is the most populous city in the state at more than
820,000, had only one member. 124
On the other hand, CRCs have had a refreshing diversity of
professions and ages. Over the decades, CRC members have been not
only the lawyers and elected officials one might expect, but also an
architect, a department store executive, a home builder, physicians,
automobile dealers, educators-including a home-school mother and
teacher-and a Disney World executive.125 Some members have been in
their seventies; two babies have been born to CRC members during their
service.
2. Politics in the Process
The appointive process for the CRC has been criticized as overtly
political. Florida's voter registration balance has been nearly evenly
divided between Democrats and Republicans (with a rapidly growing no-
party-affiliate registration) for twenty years, with a small edge to
Democrats. 126 In 2017, 4,807,950 Democrats were registered to vote;
4,544,708 Republicans were registered; and 3,514,531 minor-party or no-
party-affiliates were registered. 127 Yet, Floridians have elected
122. CONST. REVISION COMMISSION 2017-18, supra note 121; see also QuickFacts:
Miami-Dade County, Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
fact/table/miamidadecountyflorida,FLPOP1O210 (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
123. CONST. REVISION COMMISSION 2017-18, supra note 121; see also QuickFacts:
Martin County, Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/
table/martincountyflorida,FL/POP010210 (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
124. CONST. REVISION COMMISSION 2017-18, supra note 121; see also QuickFacts:
Jacksonville City, Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/
table/jacksonvillecityflorida,FL/POP10210 (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
125. See ADKINS, supra note 63, at 66 (listing 1966 CRC members); Commissioners &
Alternates, 1997-1998, FLA. ST. U.: FLA. CONST. REVISION COMMISSION, https://
fall.fsulawrc.com/crc/members.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
126. By Party Affiliation Archive, FLA. DEP'T. OF STATE: DIVISION ELECTIONS, https://
www.dos.myflorida.comlelections/data-statistics/voter-registration-statistics/voter-registr
ation-monthly-reports/voter-registration-by-party-affiliation/by-party-affiliation-archive/
(last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
127. Voter Registration - By Party Affiliation, FLA. DEP'T. OF STATE: DIVISION
ELECTIONS, https://www.dos.myflorida.com/elections/data-statistics/voter-registration-
statistics/voter-registration-monthly-reports/voter-registration-by-party-affiliation/ (last
updated July 31, 2019).
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Republican governors since 1998 and have elected Republican
supermajorities to both houses of the Legislature for nearly that long. 128
The Attorney General was a Republican; the Governor, appointing fifteen
members, was Republican; the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate, each with nine appointments, were Republican. 129 Chief
Justice Jorge Labarga was officially nonpartisan, though he was
appointed by Charlie Crist, who served as Republican Governor of
Florida before becoming elected to the United States Congress as a
Democrat. 130 The Chief Justice was often a swing vote on the court. 13 1 So,
even though Florida had more Democrats than Republicans registered to
vote, the 2017-18 CRC contained only a few Democrats. 132 Many of the
2017-18 CRC members were Republican office-holders or former office-
holders; many were educators, reflecting the Republican leadership's
interest in strengthening charter schools in the constitution; and some
were Republican financial backers. 133
128. See generally FLA. DEP'T. OF STATE: DIVISION ELECTIONS, https://
results.elections.myflorida.com/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/6/2018&DATAMODE= (last
visited Sept. 29, 2019).
129. See November 4, 2014 General Election, FLA. DEP'T. OF STATE: DIVISION ELECTIONS,
https://results.elections.myflorida.com/Index.asp?ElectionDate=1 1/4/2014&DATAMODE=
(last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
130. See November 7, 2006 General Election, FLA. DEP'T. OF STATE: DIVISION ELECTIONS,
https://results.elections.myflorida.com/Index.asp?ElectionDate=11/7/2006&DATAMODE=
(last visited Sept. 29, 2019); November 8, 2016 General Election, FLA. DEP'T. OF STATE:
DIVISION ELECTIONS, https://results.elections.myflorida.com/Index.asp?ElectionDate= 11/8/
2016&DATAMODE= (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
131. Sun Sentinel Editorial Board, The Most Conservative Florida Supreme Court in
Decades, SUN SENTINEL (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinionleditorials/fl-
op-edit-florida-supreme-court-20190 122-story.html.
132. On April 16, 2018, when the 2017-18 CRC was considering the final bundled
proposals, member Tom Lee compared the present CRC with the 1997-98 CRC, which was
nearly evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans. Transcript of Proceedings at
118, Const. Revision Comm'n (Apr. 16, 2018), http://crc.law.fsu.edulPublishedContent/
ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/MEETINGS/TRANSCRIPTS/Transcript4-16-2018
Voll.pdf. He said bluntly: "There's nothing-there's very little bipartisan about this
Commission." Id. When asked about the heavy Republican CRC majority during a panel
presentation in August 2017, 2017-18 CRC member and former Republican State Senator
Lisa Carlton answered, "Whether it's the Democrat Party [or] Republican Party, [there] are
different people with different persuasions if you will." Manatee Educational Television
METV, Manatee Tiger Bay - Florida's Constitutional Commission, YOUTUBE (Aug. 23,
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?timecontinue=1242&v=7d6aAx-olYA. Senator
Carlton had a point: the Republicans ranged from very conservative to center-leaning. Id.
133. See Florida Constitution Revision Commission, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotp
edia.org/FloridaConstitutionRevisionCommission#2017-2018 (last visited Sept. 29,
2019).
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Similarly, in 1977-78, Florida's CRC appointers were Democrats,
and the membership of the CRC had only a few Republicans. 134 In 1997-
98, the Attorney General and Governor were Democrats, the Chief
Justice was left-leaning, and both houses of the Legislature were
Republican; 135 if the members of the CRC itself reflected the party
affiliation of the appointers, its membership would be nearly evenly split
between party affiliation.
The political fact that most of the appointing authorities are officials
elected through a partisan election raises the question of whether CRC
appointees act as agents or proxies for their appointing person or body-
an agent theory-or deliberately independent under a theory of
representation similar to John Adams's, in which the appointee is chosen
"becau[s]e they think he knows more, and is better di[s]po[s]ed, than the
generality, and even than them[s]elves very often." 136 The CRC is
nominally free from politicians' self-interest because the appointing
authorities do not know what the commission will propose. Additionally,
voters rather than politicians decide whether to adopt the
recommendations. The politicians can interfere, however, in the internal
deliberation of the commission.1 37
Like the appointment process, the political agenda behind the scenes
of the CRC is not new. In 1977-78, gubernatorial appointee Jon Moyle
openly admitted his role on the CRC was to act as floor manager to
advance the priorities of Governor Askew. 138 The 2017 Speaker of the
House announced ahead of time the type of member he intended to
134. Interview with Martha Barnett, Member, Constitution Revision Comm'n 1997-98,
and Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, Chair, Constitution Revision Comm'n 1977-78, in
Tallahassee, Florida (April 29, 2014).
135. See November 8, 1994 General Election, FLA. DEP'T. OF STATE: DIVISION ELECTIONS,
https://results.elections.myflorida.com/Index.asp?ElectionDate=1 1/8/1994&DATAMODE=
(last visited Sept. 29, 2019); Gerald Kogan (Retired Chief Justice Florida Supreme Court),
JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/kogan/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) (listing awards from
the American Civil Liberties Union); Florida State Senate, BALLOTPEDIA, https://
ballotpedia.org/FloridaStateSenate (last visited Sept. 29, 2019); Florida House of
Representatives, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/FloridaHouse ofRepresentatives
(last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
136. 1 JOHN ADAMS, DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 121 (London 1787).
137. Although appointing authorities have no formal authority over their appointees,
they can still urge them to vote a certain way on a proposal, using nothing more than the
weight of their high office as pressure.
138. Interview with Jon Moyle, Member, Constitution Revision Comm'n 1977-78, in
Cape San Blas, Fla. (June 14, 2014). Askew was also a member of the 1965-67 CRC. See
ADKINS, supra note 63, at 66.
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appoint. 139 Apparently recognizing a potential for members' lingering
loyalty to the appointer, the 2017-18 CRC members created a unique
rule that membership on the powerful Rules and Administration
Committee be distributed to balance members from each appointer. 140
The composition of the CRC showed some evidence that the
governmental leaders doing the appointing held little interest in the CRC
as a serious tool for constitutional reform. As will be mentioned, no
steering committee existed to plan for the CRC;141 thus, when it was first
formed, it had no proposed rules, agenda, or schedule. The Chair, a
wealthy home builder, had little experience in government, except an
unsuccessful run for the U.S. Senate. 142 The Senate President responsible
for choosing nine members had introduced a bill in 2012 to abolish the
CRC and declared at the time, "We have a revision commission. It's called
the Florida Legislature." 14 3 The Speaker of the House, also responsible
for nine members, announced ahead of time that he would have a litmus
test for any member he appointed: he would appoint only conservatives
and would prefer to appoint only people who favored imposing term limits
on judges. 144
3. Rules of the CRC
The constitution provides that the CRC shall "adopt its rules of
procedure" as a mandatory requirement. 145 This ostensibly gives the CRC
139. See infra text accompanying note 144.
140. FLA. CONSTITUTION REVISION COMM'N 2017-18 RULES § 2.3(2), https://crc.law.fsu.
edulPublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/Rules.pdf.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 145-46.
142. Sara Kennedy, Developer Carlos Beruff: Modest Beginnings to Multimillion-Dollar
Business, BRADENTON HERALD (Aug. 4, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.bradenton.com/news/
locallarticle34587321.html; Mary Ellen Klas, Scott Names Sarasota Businessman Carlos
Beruff to be Chairman of the Constitution Revision Commission, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 1,
2017, 2:01 PM), https://miamiherald.typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2017/03/scott-names-
sarasota-businessman-carlos-beruff-to-be-chairman-of-the-constitution-revision-commissi
o.html.
143. Mary E. Adkins, The Same River Twice: A Brief History of How the 1968 Florida
Constitution Came to Be and What It Has Become, 18 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 5, 26-27(2016);
Mary Ellen Klas, Negron Gets Support for Bill to Repeal Ballot Access of Budget and Tax
Commissions, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 9, 2012, 2:41 PM), https://miamiherald.typepad.com/
nakedpolitics/2012/02/negron-gets-support-for-bill-to-repeals-ballot-access-of-budget-and-
tax-commissions.html.
144. Brandon Larrabee, Corcoran Makes Business Pitch for Judiciary Changes Zeroing
in on Responding to Rulings on Workers' Compensation Insurance, NEWS SERv. FLA. (Dec.
5, 2016, 7:26 PM), https://www.news4jax.cominews/corcoran-makes-business-pitch-for-
judiciary-changes.
145. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(c).
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considerable autonomy. Like the 1977-78 CRC, which pioneered the CRC
process under the new constitution, and unlike the 1997-98 CRC, which
had a steering committee, the 2017-18 CRC began its life with no rules
or proposed rules. Its first challenge, then, under its mandate was to
"adopt its rules of procedure." 146 This proved more difficult than
originally expected. The 1997-98 CRC had been more successful than the
previous one, having most of its proposals adopted in comparison to the
1977-78 CRC's experience of having every proposal rejected by voters. 147
A common understanding was that the 1998 success was due, in part, to
the group's rule that proposals could go to the ballot only on a
supermajority vote of twenty-two of the thirty-seven members.14 8
Therefore, it would have been logical for the 2017-18 group to adopt some
version of the 1997-98 rules. But accusations of secrecy and railroading
marred the rulemaking process and gave the CRC unfavorable
publicity. 149 Finally, the Chair of the Style and Drafting Committee prop-
osed a set of rules that received a majority vote. 150
Those rules did largely echo those of the 1997-98 CRC, which had
seemed to work so well for that body. Like the 1997-98 CRC, the 2017-
18 rules required a supermajority of twenty-two votes to send a proposal
to the ballot.151 The idea in 1997 had been to require broad consensus of
146. Id.
147. See Initiatives / Amendments / Revisions Database, FLA. DIVIsIoN ELECTIONS,
https://dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).
148. E.g., FLA. CONSTITUTION REVISION COMM'N 1997-98 MANUAL § 5.4; Interview with
Martha Barnett and Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, supra note 134.
149. See, e.g., Mary Ellen Klas, Constitution Commission Feuds Over Rules and
Adhering to Sunshine Law, MIAMI HERALD (May 31, 2017, 7:03 PM), http://www.
miamiherald.comlnews/politics-government/state-politics/articlel53679384.html. The pro-
gress of rule creation may be tracked through the corresponding transcripts and video
recordings. See Transcript of Proceedings at 18-125, Const. Revision Comm'n (June 6,
2017), http://crc.law.fsu.edulPublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/MEE
TINGS/TRANSCRIPTSITranscript6-6-2017.pdf; Transcript of Proceedings at 37-52, Const.
Revision Comm'n (Mar. 20, 2017), http://crc.law.fsu.edu/PublishedContent/ADMIN
ISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/MEETINGS/TRANSCRIPTS/TranscriptO3-20-2017.pdf; 5/
17/17 Constitution Revision Commission Rules Working Group Part 1, FLA. CHANNEL (May
17, 2017), https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/5 1717-constitution-revision-commission-
rules-working-group-part-2/; 5/17/17 Constitution Revision Commission Rules Working
Group Part 2, FLA. CHANNEL (May 17, 2017), https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/51717-
constitution-revision-commission-rules-working-group-part-2/.
150. Transcript of Proceedings at 101, 125, Const. Revision Comm'n (June 6, 2017),
http://crc.law.fsu.edulPublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/MEETING
S/TRANSCRIPTS/Transcript6-6-2017.pdf.
151. FLA. CONSTITUTION REVISION COMM'N 2017-18 RULES § 5.4, https://crc.law.fsu.edul
PublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/Rules.pdf.
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the CRC, which was nearly evenly divided between the two political
parties. 152 In 2017, almost all of the members were members of the
Republican Party, so whether the supermajority vote requirement would
make an effective difference would remain to be seen.
The 2017 rules differed in one important way from those of either
previous CRC: they allowed proposals to die in committee.1 53 Each
proposal had to survive every committee to which it was assigned before
it could be discussed by the full CRC.154
While this rule may have sounded as though it would lend efficiency
to the process, it had the effect of sharply reducing the full group's debate
on issues. If a member was interested in a bill that was not assigned to
her committee, the most she could do was attend the committee meetings
to which the proposal had been assigned and watch the action. Linking
the success of proposals to committee votes created a path dependence
for each proposal. If the particular combination of people on a committee
opposed a proposal, it would not proceed. Additionally, in all three CRCs,
the chair decided who would serve on each committee; the chair also
chose committee chairs and co-chairs, thus exerting control over the path
dependence.155
A proposal that had died in committee could be revived at a full CRC
meeting only if a majority of the CRC voted in favor of reviving it for
discussion purposes. 15 6 But, because almost all of the work was done in
committees, the full CRC met infrequently.1 57 By the midpoint of the
CRC's work, one member remarked that there were still CRC members
she had met only at the opening luncheon meeting.5s
152. Interview with Martha Barnett and Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, supra note 134.
153. FLA. CONSTITUTION REVISION COMM'N 2017-18 RULES § 2.13, https://
crc.law.fsu.edu/PublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/Rules.pdf.
154. Id. § 2.12 to 2.13; see also Transcript of Proceedings at 46-48, Const. Revision
Comm'n (Mar. 20, 2017), http://crc.law.fsu.edulPublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVE
PUBLICATIONSMEETINGS/TRANSCRIPTS/TranscriptO3-20-2017.pdf (discussing ado-
ption of legislative committee model).
155. FLA. CONSTITUTION REVISION COMM'N 2017-18 RULES § 1.3, https://crc.law.fsu.edu/
PublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/Rules.pdf; FLA. CONSTITUTION
REVISION COMM'N 1997-98 RULES § 1.3; Transcript of Proceedings at 182, Const. Revision
Comm'n (Sept. 27, 1977).
156. FLA. CONSTITUTION REVISION COMM'N 2017-18 RULES § 4.5, https://crc.law.fsu.edul
PublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/Rules.pdf.
157. See Transcripts, FLA. ST. U.: CONST. REVISION COMMISSION, https://crc.law.fsu.edul
Meetings/Transcripts.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2019) (indicating that the dates of full
commission meetings were March, June, and October 2017 and March and April 2018).
158. Interview with Jacqui Thurlow-Lippisch, Member, Constitution Revision Comm'n
2017-18, in Tallahassee, Fla. (Jan. 12, 2018).
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The rules also, as rules for deliberative bodies tend to do, allowed
those who understood their details, such as legislators and former
legislators, to wield control over the process. For example, a member
might have believed he was voting procedurally to advance a proposal for
further consideration when it was actually being voted for final
placement on the ballot. 159 This put members new to political processes
at an understandable disadvantage. As 1997-98 CRC member Martha
Barnett put it, CRC members should not be politically naive or "they'll
be eaten alive."160 Another 1997-98 member, Miami lawyer Bobby
Brochin, who was not familiar with legislative-type rules, admitted that
he failed to get through a proposal he supported, in part because others'
use of the rules against him "flummoxed" him. 16 1
The rules also led to unintended consequences. The 2017 CRC rules
provided that the Style and Drafting Committee could bundle together
items for the full CRC to pass. 162 The CRC sent twenty-five separate
proposals to the committee for a proposed ballot workup as a result of the
March 2018 plenary sessions. 163 The committee chose to bundle eighteen
of the proposals while leaving six others independent. 164 At the final April
16, 2018 session, some CRC members complained they were denied an
up or down vote on each proposal as a result of the bundling. 165 They
objected to the log-rolling effect of forcing them to choose or reject the
entire bundle.1 6 6 The strong response by another member was that the
bundling was permitted by the rules adopted over a year earlier and the
items should not be re-unbundled simply because some members failed
159. See Transcript of Proceedings at 117-18, Const. Revision Comm'n (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://crc.law.fsu.edulPublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/MEETING
S/TRANSCRIPTS/TranscriptO4-16-2018Voll.pdf.
160. Interview with Martha Barnett and Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, supra note 134.
161. Interview with Robert Brochin, Member, Constitution Revision Comm'n 1997-98,
in Miami, Fla. (July 13, 2015).
162. Alvan Balent Jr., Florida's Constitution Revision Commission (CRC): Behind-the-
Scenes Insights from Bob Butterworth, Florida's Former Attorney General and Member of
the 1998 CRC, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1073, 1085 (2018).
163. Id.
164. The Constitution Revision Commission Committee Meeting Extended Agenda,
CONST. REVISION COMM'N 2017-18 (Apr. 5, 2018), http://crc.1aw.fsu.edulPublishedContent/
Committees/2017-2018/SDfMeetingRecords/MeetingPacket 195.pdf.
165. Transcript of Proceedings at 117-18, Const. Revision Comm'n (Apr. 16, 2018), http:/
/crc.law.fsu.edulPublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/MEETINGS/TR
ANSCRIPTSITranscriptO4-16-2018Voll.pdf.
166. Id. at 71-73, 118.
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to understand their rules.167
The Florida Constitution contains public records and conflict-of-
interest provisions that apply to the CRC.168 The Florida Legislature, too,
has passed laws to govern some aspects of the CRC notwithstanding the
CRC's rule autonomy.169 Florida had amended a public-servant conflict-
of-interest statute to apply to CRC members. 170 This action had actually
been taken in 1997, when the 1997-98 CRC was traveling the state
holding its obligatory public hearings. 171 At a hearing in Pensacola, a
prominent lawyer threw a party to honor the CRC members. 172 A member
of the press who attended the party and partook in the bounty then
published a newspaper article criticizing the CRC for accepting favors
from members of the public.1 7 3 The CRC amended its rules to forbid such
conflicts, and the CRC depended on parties thrown by its own members
for the remainder of the public hearing tour.174
Perhaps as a result of the rules keeping the bulk of work at the
committee level, the few meetings the full CRC did have were brief. The
2017-18 CRC held eight plenary sessions. The final session to determine
which items would proceed to the ballot lasted nine hours on a single
day, 175 and altogether the plenary sessions totaled less than forty
hours. 176 This contrasts with the 1997 deliberative sessions, which
occupied twenty-nine days and lasted a total of more than 173 hours. 177
167. Id. at 109-12.
168. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a) (pertaining to the people's right to access public records);
FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8 (discussing conflict of interest restrictions on public officials); see
also Transcript of Proceedings-at 55-67, Const. Revision Comm'n (Mar. 20, 2017), https://
crc.law.fsu.edulPublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/MEETINGS/TRA
NSCRIPTS/TranscriptO3-20-2017.pdf (discussing public records and conflict restriction).
169. See FLA. STAT. § 112.3215(6) to (9) (2014).
170. 1997 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 54 (West) (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 112.3215
(West 2019)).
171. JOURNAL OF THE 1997-98 CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION 39 (1997); see also
FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(c).
172. Interview with Martha Barnett and Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, supra note 134.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 4/16/18 Constitution Revision Commission, FLA. CHANNEL, https://
thefloridachannel.org/videos/4-16-18-constitution-revision-commission/ (last visited Oct. 1,
2019).
176. See generally Constitutional Revision Commission: Video Library, FLA. CHANNEL,
https://thefloridachannel.org/programs/constitution-revision-commission/ (last visited Oct.
1, 2019).
177. See Constitution Revision Commission: Transcripts of CRC Meetings, FLA. ST. U.,
https://fall.fsulawrc.com/crc/minutes.html (last visited July 1, 2019).
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B. History: Long-Term Effects of Political Structure of CRCs
The Florida CRCs, over their fifty-year history, have effected change,
but often greater and more comprehensive change has been defeated by
political pressures that the structure of the CRC could not prevent. This
subsection discusses some specific examples from each of the three CRCs
and points out the legal authority that permitted or even encouraged the
politicized results.
1. Lack of Subject-Matter Standards
While the CRC's mandate to review the whole constitution is
commendable, the power it places in the hands of its members makes it
vulnerable to being treated as a chance to exercise pet projects of the CRC
members. Indeed, the need to pass policy points that have been rejected
by the Legislature was an explicit reason 1965-67 CRC Chair
Chesterfield Smith gave for providing the broadest possible power to the
CRC.178 Yet the constitution provides no standards or guidelines to the
CRC as to what types of amendments are "constitutional" and what types
are "legislative" in nature, a common point of discussion in conversations
about constitution revision. In 2017-18, several committee debates
centered around whether the constitution was intended to be a receptacle
for projects that had failed in the Legislature.1 79 And many of the
amendments proposed by the 2017-18 CRC could be characterized as
legislative in nature. For example, the 1997-98 CRC proposed, and the
public adopted, a waiting period for handgun purchases, into which
counties could opt-in.so The 2017-18 CRC provided that wagering on dog
racing should end, along with vaping in the workplace. 181
2. Authority to Make Own Rules for Each CRC
Each CRC's ability to make its own rules further illustrates the
plenary authority the 1968 constitution gave to the CRC. Yet the ability
to make new rules in each iteration means that each CRC operates
differently and may have different, inconsistent results. To what extent
178. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
179. See e.g., 1/26/18 Constitution Revision Commission Ethics and Elections
Committee, FLA. CHANNEL, at 3:34-38, https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/1-26-18-
constitution-revision-commission-ethics-elections-committee/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
180. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. (b).
181. FLA. CONST. art. X, §§ 20, 32.
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does this wide flexibility matter? In 1978, the CRC enacted a rule to allow
proposals to go to the ballot with only a majority vote of CRC members. 182
That low bar, combined with the left-leaning bent of most of the
commissioners, may have meant that the proposals did not reflect the
wishes of the public. 183 And, in 2017-18, the rule allowing committees to
table proposals, 184 effectively killing them without discussion by the full
CRC, may have squashed debate on many proposals that might have met
a different fate had they been subject to plenary discussion. If a body
meets only every twenty years, should it be subject to the same rules that
governed earlier iterations, or should it remain able to fix its own rules?
3. Training
Members from the 1997-98 CRC report having been provided thick
binders of material to study before beginning their CRC work. 185 Not so
for the 2017-18 members. Senate President Joe Negron provided his nine
appointees two soft-bound volumes, but even those were not guides
specifically written for 2017: they were the manual that had been
prepared for the 1998 CRC, and the journal that memorialized its
work.186 The members of the 2017-18 CRC were provided no training as
a group and no advance materials to help prepare them for their work on
the state's fundamental organizing document.18 7
The opening plenary meeting, brief though it was, did feature a
PowerPoint outlining the ethical duties of the CRC members, reminding
them that they could not accept some gifts and had certain financial
disclosure obligations.188 Some early committee meetings brought in
experts of different kinds to advise the members of the background of the
182. See Transcript of Proceedings at 368, Const. Revision Comm'n (Sept. 27, 1977)..
183. Interview with Martha Barnett and Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, supra note 134.
184. See FLA. CONSTITUTION REVISION COMM'N 2017-18 RULES §§ 2.12, 2.13, https://
crc.law.fsu.edulPublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/Rules.pdf.
185. Interview with Martha Barnett and Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, supra note 134;
Interview with Jon L. Mills, Member, Constitution Revision Comm'n 1997-98, in
Gainesville, Fla. (July 20, 2015).
186. Interview with Sherry Plymale, Member, Constitution Revision Comm'n 2017-18,
Port St. Lucie, Fla. (Apr. 26, 2019).
187. Id.
188. CONSTITUTION REVISION COMM'N, 2017-18 MEETING NOTICE 1, 23, 28 (2017), http:/
/crc.law.fsu.edulPublishedContentMeetings/CalendarsLinks/CRC MeetingNoticeandPa
cket_3-20-2017.pdf.
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CRC and of the kinds of issues the CRC and committees were likely to
encounter.189
4. Conflicts Regarding Comprehensive Versus Piecemeal Reform
The Florida Constitution does not prohibit CRCs from combining
separate amendments into a proposal.1 90 But public criticism of CRCs for
doing so reached a pitch in 2018.191
This controversy highlights a possible misunderstanding, or conflict
in viewpoint, in the purpose of a CRC. Is it intended to bring
comprehensive reform? If so, should it not present its plans for reform as
proposals composed of related groups of individual amendments?
Vladimir Kogan argued that a main purpose of a constitution revision
commission, like that of a constitutional convention, is to do what a
citizens' initiative cannot-plan for comprehensive constitutional
reform. 192 Yet gaining the trust and support of voters for broader reform
remains elusive. Florida's electorate, perhaps accustomed to the
constitutionally required single-subject requirement of citizens'
initiatives, has criticized the "logrolling" or "bundling" that the CRCs
have done in an effort to pack their proposals into fewer lines on the
ballot.1 93 When the 2018 CRC ballot proposals were finalized, several
leading Florida newspapers carried editorials recommending a "no" vote
on all of the bundled amendments simply on the principle that the CRC
should be subject to the same single-subject restriction as the other
methods of constitutional amendment.1 94 Lawsuits were brought to
strike the proposals from the ballot; this phenomenon had not occurred
189. See, e.g., Mary E. Adkins, Master Legal Skills Professor, Univ. of Fla. Levin Coll. of
Law, Remarks to the Declaration of Rights Committee Regarding a Historical Overview of
the CRC (Oct. 1, 2017).
190. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(c).
191. See, e.g., Elizabeth Koh, Here Are the 12 Constitutional Amendments on Florida's
2018 Ballot and What They Do, MIAMI HERALD (June 14, 2018 1:56 PM), https://
www.miamiherald.cominews/politics-government/state-politics/article213043344.html;
Jim Rosica, Pam Bondi Says Certain Constitutional Amendments Can Be "Bundled", FLA.
POL. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://floridapolitics.com/archives/272353-pam-bondi-amendments-
bundled.
192. Kogan, supra note 40, at 884.
193. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 191; Rosica, supra note 191.
194. See, e.g., Editorial: Just Vote No (Except for Amendment 4), TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct.
30, 2018), http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/editorials/editorial-just-vote-no-except-for-
amendment-4-20181030/.
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in previous CRCs. The lawsuits against the CRC proposals will be
discussed in more detail later in this Article. 195
Florida's resistance to comprehensive reform fits the pattern Kogan
described but, in so resisting, Florida ensures that it will have no body
short of a constitutional convention from which it will accept
comprehensive reform. Kogan, in recognizing this trend, referred to it as
"[t]he great irony" of state constitutional reform: "that, in an effort to win
voter approval for broader constitutional revisions that went beyond
standalone constitutional amendments, successful comprehensive
reforms came to look a lot like the piecemeal amendments that these
reforms were designed to avoid." 196
5. Vulnerability to Lobbying
The structure of the CRC does not protect CRC members from outside
influences. Not only are potential employers free to apply political
pressure on CRC members, but special interest groups can as well, and
they have. Two examples from 1998 illustrate the power of political
pressure.
The CRC was considering a proposal to reduce the size of Florida's
cabinet, which, in addition to the term-limited Governor, then consisted
of six officials elected statewide.1 9 7 Their elected status meant that they
had their own political constituencies, apart from the Governor-yet part
of their job was to decide issues of statewide importance by meeting with
the Governor as a cabinet.198 The CRC's proposal would eliminate the
elected positions of Secretary of State, Commissioner of Agriculture, and
Commissioner of Education, combine the positions of Commissioner of
Insurance and Comptroller into a new position called Chief Financial
Officer, and retain the Attorney General.1 99 Thus, the Cabinet would be
reduced to only two positions: a Chief Financial Officer and Attorney
General. The other positions would be appointed by the Governor, 200
strengthening the historically weak Florida Governor.
195. See infra Section III.D.
196. Kogan, supra note 40, at 891; see also Gais & Benjamin, supra note 12, at 1300-03.
197. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4, 5.
198. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4, 6.
199. See FLA. CONST. REVISION COMM'N, 1997-98 JOURNAL, at 152, 220; History of
Proposals, FIA. CONST. REVISION COMM'N. (May 5, 1998), https://fall.fsulawr.com/crc/
proposals/history200.html.
200. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6; FLA. CONST. REVISION COMM'N, 1997-98 JOURNAL, at
227.
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The Chair of the Executive Branch Committee tells a story that he
was working in his office one day in the basement of the Historic Capitol
when nineteen men walked in.201 They represented Florida's largest
agricultural interests: cattle, sugar, and citrus. 202 The Committee Chair
reported the spokesman for the men threatened his livelihood unless he
left the Agricultural Commissioner as an elected position.203 The chair
resisted the political brute force of being threatened and reasoned with
the men.204 But, more than twenty years later, Florida still elects a
Commissioner of Agriculture.
The second example illustrates overtly political, rather than special-
interest, pressure. In 1996, both houses of the Legislature had
Republican majorities for the first time since the Reconstruction Era. 205
Yet many of the CRC members realized that, no matter which party was
in charge, gerrymandering was an ongoing problem. Therefore, a
Republican former legislator proposed an amendment that would replace
the legislative reapportionment process with an independent
redistricting commission. 206 This commission would take reapportion-
ment out of the hands of the Legislature and leave it with a bipartisan
board of non-elected people. 207 The proposal had received the
supermajority of twenty-two votes it needed to go on the ballot for
adoption by the voters. 208
Then the Legislature came back into the capital to begin its annual
session. As Henderson and others told it, the Republican legislators could
not abide the idea that finally, after wresting power from the Democrats
201. Telephone Interview with Carlos Alfonso, Member, Constitution Revision Comm'n




205. Florida House of Representatives, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
FloridaHouse of Representatives (last visited Nov. 5, 2019); Florida State Senate,
BALLOTPEDIA, https:/Iballotpedia.org/FloridaStateSenate#Historical-party-control (last
visited Nov. 5, 2019).
206. See FLA. CONST. REVISION COMM'N, 1997-98 JOURNAL, at 240; History of Proposals,
supra note 199.
207. See id.
208. See FLA. CONST. REVISION COMM'N, 1997-98 JOURNAL, at 215-16; Interview with
Deborah Kearney, Assistant General Counsel, Constitution Revision Comm'n 1997-98, in
Tallahassee, Fla. (July 22, 2015); Telephone Interview with Ellen Freidin, Member,
Constitution Revision Comm'n 1997-98 (Aug. 26, 2015); Interview with Clay Henderson,
Member, Constitution Revision Comm'n 1997-98, in Gainesville, Fla. (Feb. 11, 2017).
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after 120 years, they would have to -give it up for a neutral system. 209
They lobbied the CRC members hard, applying both promises and
threats. It was whispered that some of those who held elected office were
threatened with campaign-fund blackballing; one CRC member whose
priority was preserving Florida's environment was promised restoration
of a dammed river in exchange for a vote change. 210
Apparently, as a result of the legislators' pressure, a majority of CRC
members voted to hold a re-vote on the independent redistricting
commission six days after the original vote to go on the ballot.211 On the
re-vote, the independent redistricting commission failed to make the'
ballot by two votes. 212
In 2017-18, a lobbying group actually succeeded in providing the text
for one of the amendments and in working with CRC members to garner
the amendment enough votes to go on the ballot. That group was
"Marsy's Law For Florida," a branch of a California-based organization,
funded by billionaire Henry Nicholas.2 13 The organization drafted
"Marsy's Law" and provides lobbyists, presumably paid, to push for
implementation of the law in several states. Representing Marsy's Law
in Florida in 2017-18 was 1997-98 Florida CRC Member Paul Hawkes,
who is employed with a Tallahassee lobbying firm.214 It passed in Florida
in 2018, and has also been passed as a constitutional amendment in
Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and
Ohio.215 Efforts to have it pass in other states are underway.216
Whether one believes lobbying is an evil to be avoided or an
expression of free speech, the attempts to structure Florida's CRC to be
free of the need to bow to political pressure have been futile.
209. See Interview with Deborah Kearney, supra note 208; Interview with Ellen Freidin,
supra note 208; Interview with Clay Henderson, supra note 208.
210. See Interview with Clay Henderson, supra note 208.
211. See FLA. CONST. REVISION COMM'N 1997-98 JOURNAL, at 230.
212. See id. at 241.
213. See About Marsy's Law, MARSY'S LAW, https://www.marsyslaw.us/
about marsys_1aw (last visited Oct. 22, 2019).
214. See Jim Rosica, Paul Hawkes Joins Buchanan Ingersoll Rooney's Lobbying Team,
FLA. POL. (May 26, 2016), https://floridapolitics.com/archives/211477-paul-hawkes-
buchanan-ingersoll; Gary Blankenship, Implementing Bill for Marsy's Law Goes Nowhere
in Legislature, FLA. BAR NEWS (May 21, 2019), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-
news/marsys-law-update/.
215. See About Marsy's Law, supra note 213.
216. See id. ("Currently, efforts are underway in Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.").
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6. No Obligation to Reflect Citizens' Wishes
Although the CRC has few obligations under the Florida
Constitution, holding public hearings is one of them. 217 Yet the CRC has
no constitutional obligation to consider the public's input-or to do
anything with it at all. All three of the CRCs held under Florida's 1968
Constitution have held public hearings before beginning their
constitution-revision work. The 1977-78 CRC was on the tightest
schedule of the three, because a court opinion deciding its actual starting
date gave it little time to plan or hold hearings. 218 The 1977 hearings
were held in a rush in a five-week period, and the CRC held its first
working session the very next day.219 The 1997-98 CRC held two rounds
of public hearings, with the first a tour of Florida in which the CRC took
submissions from the public as to which constitutional amendments
members of the public would like to see.220 That CRC's rules then called
for each of the several hundred proposals to be considered in an early
plenary session; any proposal receiving at least ten votes would move
forward, assigned to a CRC member as its sponsor.221 That process was
the basis for the 1997-98 CRC's amendments, although members could
propose amendments other than those submitted by the public as well. 222
In the spring and early summer of 2017, the 2017-18 CRC held
fifteen public hearings in a grand round of Florida.223 Members of the
public submitted 782 proposals on the CRC's website.224 But the 2017-18
CRC, in practice, advised that a member should sponsor a public proposal
only if that member wished to use the exact language the member of the
public had used.225 This restriction meant that the great majority of the
217. See FLA. CONsT. art. XI, § 2(c).
218. See In re Advisory Op. of the Governor Request of November 19, 1976 (Constitution
Revision Commission), 343 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla. 1977).
219. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL RESP., PUBLIC TESTIMONY BEFORE THE FLA. CONST.
REVISION COMMITTEE 1 (1977).
220. See FLA. CONST. REVISION COMM'N 1997-98 MANUAL, back cover.
221. Id. at § 3.3.
222. Id. at § 3.35.
223. Public Hearings, CONST. REVISION COMM'N, http://crc.law.fsu.edulMeetings/
PublicHearings.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2019).
224. Id.
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publicly submitted proposals were not officially taken up by the CRC. 226
Although many more concepts proposed by the public were considered,
proposed, and argued by the CRC, the public perception was that the
CRC ignored almost all of its suggestions.227 The optics were horrible.
7. Effective and Ineffective Use of Technology
Unlike any of the previous CRCs, the 2017-18 one had access to not
only the World Wide Web, but also social media. While the 1997-98 CRC
was cutting-edge for its time, posting committee and meeting
information, member biographies, and transcripts of its plenary meetings
online, the 2017-18 CRC used the easy and ubiquitous access to the web
and social media to get its word out.228 It had a Facebook page that was
regularly updated, and it had an elegantly designed, easy-to-use website
that made its work reasonably accessible to anyone who wished to look.229
In fact, CRC members were often heard to remark that they received
hundreds of e-mails weekly from the public on their CRC e-mail
account. 230
In some other ways, however, the 2017-18 CRC failed to use
available technology. Members were required to attend meetings in
Tallahassee, an eight-hour drive from Miami, in person unless they
submitted in advance a documented reason to be absent; if the
226. See Constitutional Revision Commission: Matches Between Public Proposals and
Commissioner Proposals, FLA. ST. U.: CONST. REVISION COMMISSION, http://crc.law.fsu.edu/
PublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/CRCProposalMatches.pdf (last
visited Oct. 22, 2019).
227. See, e.g., Lloyd Dunkelberger, Florida Constitution Commission Advances More
Public Proposals, NEWS 4 JAX (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.news4jax.com/news/floridal
constitution-commission-advances-more-public-proposals.
228. Compare FLA. CONST. REVISION COMM'N 1997-98, https://fall.fsulawrc.com/crc/
(last visited Oct. 22, 2019), with FLA. CONST. REVISION COMM'N 2017-18, https://
crc.law.fsu.edu/index.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2019). The official Florida Constitution
Revision Commission Facebook page is no longer active but entering that search term on
Facebook reveals that many groups and individuals posted about the CRC. See Search
Results for "florida constitution revision commission", FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=florida%20constitution%2Orevision%20commission&epa
=SEARCHBOX (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
229. "Reasonably" accessible because not all of the materials for meetings were posted
in advance of those meetings, and transcripts of committee meetings were often slow to
appear. However, every CRC meeting, whether committee or plenary, was livestreamed on
its website and on the Florida Channel. See Constitution Revision Commission Video
Library, FLA. CHANNEL, https://thefloridachannel.org/programs/constitution-revision-
commission/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2019).
230. E.g., Interview with Hank Coxe, Member, Constitution Revision Comm'n 2017-18,
in Tallahassee, Fla. (Jan. 26, 2018).
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documented reason was medical, they were then allowed to appear by
video. 231 When Hurricane Irma ravaged the entire Floridian peninsula
on the weekend of September 10 to 11, 2017, the rules in place did not
allow for absence and appearance by video due to damaged or destroyed
homes, property, or roads.
C. Judicial Review of 2017-18 CRC Work: Interference by the Judicial
Branch?
It has been correctly said that "the countermajoritarian nature of
judicial review is never more apparent than when a judge strikes down a
law that the electorate itself has made." 232 The CRC was created to be
independent from interference from the legislative and executive
branches. In 2018, for the first time, it encountered interference from the
judicial branch. The CRC submitted eight bundled amendments which
contained twenty discrete constitutional changes to the Secretary of
State on May 9, 2018.233 Within eight days the first lawsuit was filed
challenging a proposed amendment. This was a novel development; no
lawsuits had been filed against either the 1978 or 1998 bundled
amendments by the CRC.234 How the court resolved the cases raises
questions about when it should intervene in a CRC proposal and the
standard of review used. Both the court's asserted basis to intervene and
the standard of review used in the 2018 CRC decisions fail to note that
its legal analysis is lifted from cases on citizens' initiatives and legislative
proposals, whose laws have themselves have shifted over time.
The Florida Legislature had the sole authority to propose
constitutional amendments or call a plenary constitutional convention
before the 1968 revision. The Florida Supreme Court was historically
231. See Rules of the Const. Revision Comm'n 2017-18, FL. ST. U. §§ 1.17, 2.11, https://
crc.law.fsu.edulPublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/Rules.pdf (last vi-
sited Oct. 22, 2019).
232. Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2748, 2756
(2005); see also Scott L. Kafker & David A. Russcol, The Eye of a Constitutional Storm: Pre-
election Review by the State Judiciary of Initiative Amendments to State Constitutions, 2012
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1279, 1315-19 (2012) (favoring judicial review before elections).
233. See Initiatives, Amendments, Revisions Database, FLA. DIVISION ELECTIONS, https:/
/dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/ (search Year "2018", Status "ALL", Sponsor
"Constitution Revision Commission").
234. The court determined in an advisory opinion when the 1977 CRC would convene,
but there was no litigation over CRC proposals. See In re Advisory Op. of the Governor
Request of November 19, 1976 (Constitution Revision Commission), 343 So. 2d 17, 23-24
(Fla. 1977).
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wary of interfering with amendments proposed by the Legislature,
intervening only in cases of clear illegality. 235 The court affirmed its
authority to do so, however, in a 1912 case holding its involvement was
required because "such determination is necessarily required to be in a
judicial forum where the Constitution provides no other means. of
authoritatively determining such questions." 236 There was no significant
interference by the court in the legislative amendment process until it
invalidated a 1955 attempt by the Pork Chop Legislature to tie a number
of amendments together on an all-or-nothing daisy-chain. 237 The then-
existing 1885 constitution allowed proposed amendments only to a single
article. 238 The court found that the Legislature's tying-in effect
bundling-the amendments to different articles together so that either
all would pass or all fail violated the single-article. restriction. 239 In a
companion case, the court refused to invalidate another amendment on
the basis that eliminating the daisy-chain amendments left the single,
standalone amendment otiose. 240 The court wrote:
This is the most sanctified area in which a court can exercise
power. Sovereignty resides in the people and the electors have a
right.to approve or reject a proposed amendment to the organic
law of the State, limited only by those instances where there is
an entire failure to comply with a plain and essential
requirement of the organic law in proposing the amendment
241
The 1968 revision created three new ways to amend the constitution:
by citizens' initiative, by the recurring CRC, or by a plenary convention
called by the voters or the Legislature. 242 Unusual for the Florida
235. E.g., Gray v. Moss, 156 So. 262, 264 (Fla. 1934).
236. Crawford v. Gilchrist, 59 So. 963, 966 (Fla. 1912).
237. See Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So. 2d 501, 505 (Fla. 1958); ADKINS, supra note 63, at
23-24. Until 1982, the court decided cases brought on alleged unclear or misleading ballot
summaries by local governments but never any cases regarding an amendment filed by the
Legislature. E.g., Miami Dolphins Ltd. v. Metro. Dade Cty., 394 So. 2d 981, 987 (Fla. 1981);
Hill v. Milander, 72 So. 2d 796, 797-98 (Fla. 1954) (en banc).
238. See FLA. CONST. art XVII, § 1 (1885), amended by H.R.J. Res. 118, Reg. Sess. (Fla.
1947); accord Rivera-Cruz, 104 So. 2d at 502.
239. See Rivera-Cruz, 104 So. 2d at 505.
240. See Pope v. Gray, 104 So. 2d 841, 841-42 (Fla. 1958).
241. Id.
242. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 2-4 (1968) (providing the three revised ways to amend
the constitution: by CRC, by citizens' initiative, and by citizen-called convention,
respectively).
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Constitution, both the sections on the citizens' initiative and the citizens'
call of convention have explicit language that the "power . . . is reserved
to the people," thus making it plain that the power remains with the
citizens and is not delegated to the state.243 The Legislature can also
propose amendments, as before, but lost the power to convene a plenary
convention.244 Citizens' initiatives alone have the limitation of keeping a
single initiative to a single subject.24 5 The constitution provides that the
amendment or revision other than an initiative "shall be submitted" at
the next general election unless a supermajority of the Legislature votes
for a special election on a single amendment. 246 An initiative "shall be
submitted" at the next general election if filed before February 1st of the
election year.24 7 The proposed amendment must be published in a
newspaper in each county twice: at ten and six weeks before the
election. 248
The Florida Legislature has promulgated additional laws governing
the ballot process for amendments, including that all proposed
amendments must contain a title to be printed on the ballot and a short
precis describing the amendment. 249 This analysis will concentrate on
Florida cases dealing with the ballot summary and explanation, setting
aside the multitude of cases on the single-subject requirement. 250
Florida has used ballot summaries in lieu of the actual text of a
proposed amendment since 1895.251 While the full text is posted at each
polling place, the abbreviated title and summary are all that appear on
the voters' ballots. 252 The Florida Legislature has amended its ballot title
243. FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 3, 4(a).
244. Compare FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 4 (1968) (providing the Legislature's ability to
propose amendments and the people's power to consider a revision), with FLA. CONST. art.
XVII, §§ 1-2 (1885) (providing the Legislature's ability to propose amendments and call for
a convention).
245. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
246. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a).
247. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(b).
248. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(d).
249. FLA. STAT. § 101.161(1) (2019).
250. See generally Annotation, Construction and Application of Constitutional or
Statutory Requirement as to Short Title, Ballot Title, or Explanation of Nature of Proposal
in Initiative, Referendum, or Recall Petition, 106 A.L.R. 555 (2019) (listing updated coverage
of all states' requirements).
251. Thomas Rutherford, The People Drunk or the People Sober? Direct Democracy Meets
the Supreme Court of Florida, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 61, 146 n.465 (2002) (providing that
the "summary of a proposed amendment, rather than its text, be printed on the ballot is a
requirement that is over 100 years old").
252. See FLA. STAT. § 101.171 (2019).
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and summary requirements sixteen times since 1968.253 Two
amendments to those statutes and one constitutional amendment are
relevant to this discussion of judicial review of CRC proposals. In an
innocuous-appearing statute change in 1977, the Legislature required
that all bodies proposing amendments, including plenary conventions
and the CRC, submit a statement "of the substance of the amendment"
directly to the supervisor of elections for placement on the ballot;
however, initiative summaries were .still prepared by the Department of
State until 1979.254 In 1980, the Legislature again amended the statute,
and required that the substance of the amendment (or other public
measure, such as a local referendum) "shall be printed in clear and
unambiguous language." 235 The submitting body would now also include
a ballot title not exceeding fifteen words and an "explanatory statement"
not exceeding seventy-five words.256 The explanatory statement would be
"of the chief purpose of the measure." 257
In 1986, the Legislature proposed, and the voters adopted, a
constitutional amendment expediting the review process that required
the supreme court to review all proposed initiatives. 258 That court has
developed an extensive, if not always consistent, jurisprudence for ballot
titles and summaries. 259
Regarding its review of ballot titles and summaries, the court states
that it only intervenes if "the record shows that the proposal is clearly
and conclusively defective."260 The ballot title and summary must inform
253. Refer to the legislative history accompanying FLA. STAT. § 101.161 (2019).
254. 1977 Fla. Laws 965. Initiative sponsors were required to submit the summary to
the Department and approval by the Secretary of State beginning July 1979. 1979 Fla.
Laws 1858 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 101.161 (2019)); see also 1973 Fla. Laws 38
(requiring legislation proposing constitutional amendments to contain a summary of the
amendment's substance).
255. 1980 Fla. Laws 1342-43.
256. 1980 Fla. Laws 1343.
257. Id.
258. P.K. Jameson & Marsha Hoscak, Citizen Initiatives in Florida: An Analysis of
Florida's Constitutional Initiative Process, Issues, and Alternatives, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
417, 426 (1995).
259. See Patrick 0. Gudridge, Complexity and Contradiction in Florida Constitutional
Law, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 879, 886-87 (2010).
260. Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7, 11 n.9 (Fla. 2000) (citing Askew v. Firestone, 421
So. 2d 151, 154 (Fla. 1982)); see also In re Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re Referenda Required
for Adoption and Amendment of Local Gov't Comprehensive Land Use Plans, 902 So. 2d
763, 765 (Fla. 2005) (noting in regard to initiatives, "the Court has no authority to inject
itself in the process, unless the laws governing the process have been 'clearly and
conclusively' violated" (emphasis added) (quoting In re Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re Right
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the voter of the chief purpose of the amendment and must not mislead
the voter. 261 The court, however, has not been entirely consistent on the
source of its authority to police ballot titles and summaries for
amendments proposed by the Legislature and CRC, much less a plenary
convention. 262
Two key opinions led to the 2018 decisions. In 1982 the Supreme
Court of Florida, in Askew v. Firestone, invalidated a proposed legislative
amendment based on a misleading ballot summary. 263 The Legislature
proposed amending a section of the constitution that restricts lobbying
for two years by former legislators or statewide elected officials of their
former governmental bodies.264 The Legislature's ballot summary stated
that the change required financial disclosure during the two-year ban,
implying the change made the prohibition more restrictive.265 In fact, the
financial disclosure allowed former legislators to instantly lobby.266 The
court immediately spotted the self-dealing flimflam, held the ballot
summary misleading, and removed the proposed amendment from the
ballot.267 The court relied for its authority to do so on the newly enacted
1980 version of section 101.161 of the Florida Code and its prior decisions
with municipal referenda. 268 Without citing any legal precedent,
however, the court held that "[t]he requirement for proposed[
constitutional amendment ballots is the same as for all ballots . . . ."269
The application of section 101.161 to all proposed amendments has
mostly proceeded unchallenged. In fact, before 2000 only one reported
attack occurred on the application of section 101.161 to proposed
to Treatment and Rehabilitation for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So. 2d 491, 498-99
(Fla. 2002))).
261. Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re Fairness Initiative Requiring Legislative
Determination that Sales Tax Exemptions and Exclusions Serve a Public Purpose, 880 So.
2d 630, 635-36 (Fla. 2004).
262. Compare, e.g., Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 156 (Fla. 1982) (finding authority
to review based on enforcing a statute), with Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7, 22 (2001)
(finding authority to review implicit in the constitution's ballot accuracy requirement).
263. 421 So. 2d at 156.
264. Id. at 153.
265. Id. at 155-56.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 154-55.
269. Id. at 155.
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amendments. 270 There, the court merely recited one party's textbook
attack against applying section 101.161:
The [sponsor] argues that it has fully complied with all the
constitutional provisions, to date, of placing a proposed
amendment on the ballot and it cannot constitutionally be
prevented from doing so because of any failure, or alleged failure,
to meet the additional statutory requirements of section 101.161.
In the [sponsor's] view, the ballot summary, while useful, is not
a bar to placing the proposed amendment on the ballot for voter
consideration.
27 1
The court held it need not resolve this argument because it had already
decided the ballot title and summary were proper.272
The second case on which the Supreme Court of Florida based its
authority to rule on constitutional ballot summaries was the 2000 case of
Armstrong v. Harris.273 In Armstrong, the court again confronted
whether the ballot summary of a legislatively proposed amendment was
misleading.274 The part receiving the court's attention was a forced
linkage of Florida interpretations of "cruel and unusual punishment" to
U.S. Supreme Court interpretations. 275 In a four-to-three decision with
two concurring opinions, the seven-member court held the title and
summary were both misleading because they failed to inform the voter
that the proposed amendment eliminated the more liberal "cruel or
unusual" Florida standard in favor of a stricter "cruel and unusual"
federal standard.276 The amendment, however, passed by a historically
high seventy-two percent passage rate at the November 1998 election
before the court began processing the case in 1999 and issuing its opinion
in September 2000, thus invalidating an amendment already adopted.2 77
270. See Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen., Limitation of Non-Econ. Damages in Civil Actions,
520 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1988).
271. Id. at 287; see also Rutherford, supra note 251, at 150 n.495 (noting argument raised
but not addressed by the court).
272. Advisory Op. re Limitation, 520 So. 2d at 287.
273. 773 So. 2d 7, 21-22 (Fla. 2000).
274. Id. at 10.
275. Id. at 16-18.
276. Id. at 18, 21 (emphasis added).
277. See SENATE STAFF, ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT TO SJR 124, Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2001); see also Preservation of the Death Penalty; United States Supreme Court
Interpretation of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, FLA. DIVISION ELECTIONS, https://
dos.elections. myflorida.cominitiatives/initdetail. asp?account= 10&seqnum=2 (last visited
Oct. 2, 2019, 9:02 PM) (providing vote totals).
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The State filed a supplemental brief arguing that the court lacked
authority to invalidate an amendment already approved by the voters. 278
Specifically, the Solicitor General contended that section 101.161, which
required a ballot title and a clear and unambiguous ballot summary of
fewer than seventy-five words, should not control the self-executing
provisions for constitutional amendments. 279 Armstrong is apparently
only the second case to challenge the court's authority to intervene on
title and summary issues. The court noted there was no argument that it
lacked authority to review the amendment or that the issue was not
justiciable. 280 The court sidestepped the argument that section 101.161
could not control the self-executing constitutional provisions for
amendments. In an expansive opinion, the court held that the Florida
Constitution found its authority to invalidate a legislatively proposed
amendment in an implicit accuracy requirement found in the
constitution. 281 One dissenting justice denied that there is an "implicit"
accuracy requirement in the constitution dealing with amendments. 282
One commentator has rightly questioned whether the cited
constitutional section has an implicit accuracy requirement and wrote:
"Pretty plainly, Florida judging drives the development of the ballot
summary accuracy requirement." 283
Five years later, the court tied together the two concepts of explicit
statutory requirements with the implicit constitutional requirement by
holding: "Section 101.161(1) is a codification of the accuracy requirement
implicit in article XI, section 5 of the Florida Constitution."284
While the court had not decided a case on an amendment proposed
by the CRC before 2018, it has intervened in proposals originating from
the Tax and Budget Reform Commission ("TBRC"), the second recurring
body created in the constitution. 285 Unlike the CRC, the TBRC has a
limited constitutional mandate confined to issues of budget and finance,
which led to a decision removing a proposed TBRC amendment on the
278. Brief for Appellants, Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2000) (No. 95,223),
1999 WL 33626552, at *5.
279. Id. at *5, *15.
280. Armstrong, 773 So. 2d at 10-11.
281. Armstrong, 773 So. 2d at 21 ("The accuracy requirement in article XI, section 5,
imposes a strict minimum standard for ballot clarity.").
282. Id. at 26-27 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
283. Gudridge, supra note 259, at 889.
284. Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re Referenda Required for Adoption and Amendment of
Local Gov't Comprehensive Land Use Plans, 902 So. 2d 763, 770 (Fla. 2005).
285. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 6.
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grounds that it overstepped that authority.2 8 6 The Supreme Court of
Florida upheld two other TBRC-proposed amendments against accuracy
challenges, again with no challenges regarding either the court's ability
to do so or the applicability of. section 101.161 to ballot titles and
summaries. 287
Importantly, the Legislature, the CRCs, and the TBRCs may revise
and bundle amendments to many parts of the constitution, and the
Legislature and CRC may amend the entire constitution. 288 The seventy-
five word ballot summary is strained to convey "the chief purpose of the
measure" in "clear and unambiguous language" when many items are
bundled or the entire document revised.289
This constraint was apparently recognized by the Legislature.
Immediately prior to the 2000 decision in Armstrong v. Harris, the
Legislature selectively eliminated the ballot summary requirement for
amendments proposed by the Legislature. 290 Eleven years later in 2011,
the Legislature reasserted that its proposed amendments or revisions
must contain one or more ballot statements; that each ballot statement
consisting of a ballot title does not exceed fifteen words; and that a ballot
summary describing the chief purpose of the amendment or revision is in
clear and unambiguous language. 29 1 No word limit was imposed.292 The
Legislature also gave itself the option to provide the actual text of the
amendment or revision instead of a ballot summary; the supervisors of
elections were commanded to modify voting machines to accommodate
the full length of potential amendments or revisions by the end of 2013.293
In 2013, the Legislature backtracked and removed the full text option.294
It also limited itself to a seventy-five word ballot summary for a single
286. Id. at § 6(d); see Ford v. Browning, 992 So. 2d 132, 139-41 (Fla. 2008).
287. See Fla. Dep't of State v. Slough, 992 So. 2d 142, 147 (Fla. 2008) (holding that the
ballot title and summary for proposed Amendment 5 were misleading); Smith v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 606 So. 2d 618, 620-21 (Fla. 1992) (holding the ballot summary ambiguous
and thus in violation of section 101.161).
288. FIA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 2(c), 6(d); Detzner v. Anstead, 256 So. 3d 820, 823-24 (Fla.
2018) (per curiam).
289. FLA. STAT. § 101.161(1) (2019).
290. 2000 Fla. Laws 4035; accord Fla. Dep't of State v. Mangat, 43 So. 3d 642, 649 (Fla.
2010); Sancho v. Smith, 830 So. 2d 856, 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); FINAL BILL ANALYSIS,
H.R. 7013, 2013 Leg., at 7-8 (Fla. 2013).
291. 2011 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 416-17 (West).
292. Id.
293. Id. at 624, 626 (adding presumption that full text option is a clear and unambiguous
statement of the amendment).
294. 2013 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 977 (West) (removing presumption that amendment is
clear and unambiguous); FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, H.R. 7013, 2013 Leg., at 8 (Fla. 2013).
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amendment or the first ballot summary of multiple amendments, with
no specified word limit on the second or subsequent amendments. 295 This
sequence of events plainly expresses the recognition that seventy-five
words may be insufficient for multiple amendments and opens the
possibility that the Legislature may bundle multiple amendments in a
take-it-or-leave-it revision.
There was no such word-limit flexibility for the 2018 CRC proposals.
The five lawsuits filed in 2018 against CRC proposals were brought in
the trial court in Leon County, the judicial circuit where the capital is
located and assigned to three different trial judges. 296 One trial judge
upheld one proposed amendment; 297 the two other trial judges struck four
other amendments from the November 2018 ballot.298 All five trial court
rulings were fast-tracked to the supreme court on appeal, bypassing the
intermediate court of appeal. Unlike the citizens' initiative review, which
occurs in the Supreme Court of Florida on original jurisdiction, a lower
court had already ruled upon the accuracy of the amendments. 299
The appeals proceeded on accelerated time schedules that did not
permit the customary preparation by the parties or deliberation by the
court, as the county supervisors of elections needed final ballot
information in time to prepare ballots before early voting would begin.
The court therefore imposed draconian time limits on briefing, oral
argument, and rulings. 300 The average time between the Florida
295. 2013 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 977 (West).
296. See Cty. of Volusia v. Detzner, 253 So. 3d 507, 508 (Fla. 2018) (per curiam); Dep't
of State v. Fla. Greyhound Ass'n, Inc., 253 So. 3d 513, 517 (Fla. 2018); Dep't of State v.
Hollander, 256 So. 3d 1300, 1301 (Fla. 2018); Detzner v. League of Women Voters of Fla.,
256 So. 3d 803, 804 (Fla. 2018) (per curiam); Detzner v. Anstead, 256 So. 3d 820, 822 (Fla.
2018) (per curiam).
297. Cty. of Volusia, 253 So. 3d at 508.
298. Greyhound Ass'n, 253 So. 3d at 517; Hollander, 256 So. 3d at 1301; League of Women
Voters, 256 So. 3d at 804; Anstead, 256 So. 3d at 822.
299. See Advisory Opinion to the Att'y General re Referenda Required for Adoption &
Amendment of Local Gov't Comprehensive Land Use Plans, 902 So. 2d 763, 764 (Fla. 2005)
(noting the initiative comes directly to the supreme court through the Attorney General).
300. Compare Order for Brief Schedule, 253 So. 3d 507 (Fla. 2018) (allowing eight initial
days, six days to answer, and three days to reply), Order for Brief Schedule, 253 So. 3d 513
(Fla. 2018) (allowing eight initial days, six days to answer, and three days to reply), Order
for Brief Schedule, 256 So. 3d 1300 (Fla. 2018) (allowing two initial days, one day to answer,
and three days to reply), Order for Brief Scheduling, 256 So. 3d 803 (Fla. 2018) (allowing
five initial days, two days to answer, and two days to reply), and Order for Brief Scheduling,
256 So. 3d 820 (Fla. 2018) (allowing five initial days, four days to answer, and three days
to reply), with FLA. R. APP. P. 9.110(f) (allowing seventy days for initial brief), and FLA. R.
APP. P. 9.210(f) (allowing thirty days for answer brief and thirty days for reply brief).
1221
1222 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 71:1177
Supreme Court receiving the notice of the appeal and the filing of the
initial brief in the five cases was approximately six days, and the average
time between notice of the appeal and oral argument in the three cases
argued was fifteen days. 301 The court, on average, issued rulings within
forty-one days from the notice of appeal being filed. In all five cases the
average time between the original filing of the lawsuit in the trial court
and the Florida Supreme Court's ruling was eighty-nine days.302
It is of interest that, unlike the Florida Solicitor General's 2000
supplemental brief, no party in any of the five lawsuits ever raised at the
trial or appellate level the issues of either justiciability over a self-
executing constitutional process or the inapplicability of section 101.161
to the CRC proposals. The Florida Attorney General, the sole mandatory
member of the CRC, was a party in four cases defending the CRC
proposed amendments. The Attorney General never suggested that the
CRC amendments could not or should not be reviewed by the courts.303
All the briefs filed in the litigation challenging the 2018 amendments
assumed the validity of section 101.161, which required a ballot title and
clear and unambiguous ballot summary of less than seventy-five words.
On appeal the court reversed three rulings that had struck
amendments and restored them to the ballot. 304 The court also sustained
one ruling to maintain a proposal on the ballot.305 Therefore, four of the
five challenged amendments were returned to the ballot for voting. The
gravamen of all four cases were objections to bundling items and
misleading summaries. 306 The court concluded that the single-subject
rule in the constitution did not apply to the CRC and that CRCs may
301. See *Online Public Docket, FLA. CTS., https://www.flcourts.org/Florida-Courts/
Online-Public-Docket (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
302. See id.
303. Brief for Petitioner at 1-2, Dep't of State v. Fla. Greyhound Ass'n, Inc., 253 So. 3d
513 (Fla. 2018) (No. SC 18-1287) (urging the court to apply the statute as a standard); Brief
for Petitioner, Dep't of State v. Hollander, 256 So. 3d 1300 (Fla. 2018) (No. SC 18-1366);
Brief for Petitioner, Detzner v. League of Women Voters of Fla., 256 So. 3d 803 (Fla. 2018)
(No. SC 18-1368); Brief for Appellant, Detzner v. Anstead, 256 So. 3d 820 (Fla. 2018) (No.
SC 18-1513).
304. Fla. Greyhound, 253 So. 3d at 525; Hollander, 256 So. 3d at 1311; Anstead, 256 So.
3d at 825.
305. Cty. of Volusia v. Detzner, 253 So. 3d 507, 513 (Fla. 2018) (per curiam).
306. Id. at 510-11 (rejecting arguments that the amendment title and summary were
misleading); Fla. Greyhound, 253 So. 3d at 518-20 (rejecting arguments that the
amendment title and summary were misleading); Hollander, 256 So. 3d at 1306, 1311
(rejecting arguments that the amendment title and summary were misleading and
disregarding one party's objection to violating the single subject requirement); Anstead, 256
So. 3d at 823 (rejecting arguments that the amendments were bundled or that they had
misleading summaries).
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bundle dissimilar proposals; it also noted, accurately, that prior CRCs
had bundled items.307 The court also acknowledged the CRC's plenary
power to propose amending the entire constitution as a reason to allow
bundling: "The power to amend the whole constitution in one proposal
necessarily includes the lesser power to amend parts of the constitution
in one proposal." 308 In a concurring opinion in one case, three justices
expressed their extreme dislike of bundling, especially for dissimilar
proposals. 309 Bundling may now be vulnerable if the bundle summary is
determined to be misleading or insufficiently clear,31o although the
Legislature's 2013 changes may selectively remove this concern from
legislative proposals. Bundling, therefore, can frustrate both deliberation
of the proposing body and the understanding of the public debate over
the proposal.
The court, however, also upheld a trial court ruling that had struck
an education amendment from the ballot. In its opinion, styled Detzner
v. League of Women Voters of Florida, the court repeated its conclusion
that Section 101.161 is a codification of the implicit accuracy
requirement; "otherwise, voter approval would be a nullity."311 It also
repeated dicta from its Armstrong v. Harris decision on legislative
amendments: that the accuracy requirement applies to all amendments,
presumably even amendments from a plenary constitutional con-
vention. 312 The amendment struck from the ballot was broadly
understood to allow the Legislature to establish charter schools separate
from the locally based school districts. A four-member majority of the
court concluded that the summary failed "to inform voters of [the] true
307. Anstead, 256 So. 3d at 823; accord Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. re Limits or Prevents
Barriers to Local Solar Elec. Supply, 177 So. 3d 235, 242 (Fla. 2015) (noting that only
petition initiatives have the single subject restriction); Charter Rev. Comm'n of Orange Cty.
v. Scott, 647 So. 2d 835, 837 (Fla. 1994) ("Only proposals originating through a petition
initiative are subject to the single-subject rule.").
308. Anstead, 256 So. 3d at 824.
309. Id. at 825-28 (Pariente, J., concurring); see also Hollander, 256 So. 3d at 1312
(Pariente, J., dissenting). "A voter cannot intelligently cast his or her ballot if multiple
issues of varying complexity and clarity are lumped together under one general
amendment-especially when presented through defective ballot summary language."
Detzner v. League of Women Voters of Fla., 256 So. 3d 803, 816 (Fla. 2018) (Lewis, J.,
concurring).
310. Cty. of Volusia, 253 So. 3d at 512 ("It follows that the bundling of measures creates
a defect only if the measures are presented on the ballot in a misleading way.").
311. League of Women Voters, 256 So. 3d at 807 (quoting Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So.
2d 7, 12 (Fla. 2000)).
312. Id. (citing Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7, 16 (Fla. 2000)).
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meaning and ramifications" of the amendment. 313 Specifically, the court
held the summary failed to inform the voters "who or what, other than
district school boards, currently has the authority to establish public
schools, which categories of public schools will be affected, and who or
what will have the authority to establish future public schools" under the
amendment.314 Three of the justices forming the Detzner v. League of
Women Voters majority retired from the court less than three months
later under Florida's then-mandatory retirement age of seventy.315 The
three-member dissent found the summary advised the public of the
''constitutional status quo" that local school boards currently operate all
schools.3 16 The dissent argued that the summary then informed the
voters that the amendment would allow local school boards to continue
in that capacity but would also allow a separate category of schools to be
created and operated outside of local school boards.317
The court's conclusion that the ballot summary was misleading was
ironic given the effort put forth by the CRC on that issue. The Style and
Drafting Committee studied the ballot summaries and engaged a "hall of
fame group" of outside lawyers to review the proposed summaries. 318 The
CRC rules allowed its Style and Drafting Committee to recommend the
grouping of any related proposals. 319 The Chair of the Style and Drafting
Committee explained the education changes were bundled to meet the
seventy-five word limit.320 The full commission carefully debated the title
313. Id. at 809.
314. Id.
315. The 2018 proposed amendment, extending the mandatory retirement age, excluded
judges or justices facing retirement in January 2019, as it provided it would not take effect
until July 1, 2019. Proposed Constitutional Amendments and Revisions for the 2018
Election, FLA. DIVISION ELECTIONS (Jan. 1, 2019), https://dos.myflorida.com/media/699824/
constitutional-amendments-2018-general-election-english.pdf. This amendment was
adopted to the state constitution. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 8.
316. League of Women Voters, 256 So. 3d at 817 (Canady, J., dissenting).
317. Id.
318. Transcript of Proceedings at 1, 6-7, 68-69, Const. Revision Comm'n (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://crc.law.fsu.edulPublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONSMEETING
S/TRANSCRIPTS/TranscriptO3-20-2017.pdf. It is also interesting that Ballotpedia
calculated that the Florida CRC's proposals had the easiest readability level of ballot titles
of the 167 statewide ballot measures in the nation. Ballot Measure Readability Scores,
BALLOTPEDIA (2018), https://ballotpedia.org/Ballot-measure-readability-scores, 2018.
319. FLA. CONSTITUTION REVISION COMM'N 2017-18 RULES § 5.4(2), https://
crc.law.fsu.edulPublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/Rules.pdf.
320. Transcript of Proceedings at 171-72, Const. Revision Comm'n (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://crc.law.fsu.eduPublishedContent/ADMINISTRATIVEPUBLICATIONS/MEETING
S/TRANSCRIPTS/TranscriptO3-20-2017.pdf.
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and summary to the bundled education proposal and was assured that a
number of legal experts had opined it met the standards. 321
Key assumptions supporting the majority Detzner v. League of
Women Voters opinion may have gone unexamined during the harried
CRC litigation cycle. One assumption is that section 101.161 applies to
all proposed constitutional amendments. It is difficult to believe that the
court would reach the same result if, instead of a CRC, this had been an
extensive constitutional revision proposed by a citizen-called convention.
There is the added practical problem of whether a substantial revision of
the constitution can be summarized in seventy-five words and whether it
is sound public policy to have voters decide on a major overhaul based on
a short summary. Ballot integrity does not appear to be at stake, as the
Legislature has exempted itself from the word limit for multiple items.
Finally, it is questionable that the court would have authority to refuse
the voters an opportunity to decide on the results of a plenary convention,
and the CRC is not far removed from a plenary convention. Indeed, the
CRC was designed to "impose a more orderly and stringent process for
amendment of the 1968 constitution." 322
IV. SUGGESTED REFORMS
Public frustration with constitutional reform is nothing new. 323
Voters mistrust not only their elected representatives but also members
of what Gais and Benjamin have called the "government industry":
agency administrators, political party leaders, and "good government"
advocates. 324 Florida's experience with its most recent CRC reflects this
mistrust. The mistrust began with the realization that all of the major
appointing authorities shared one political party, in a divided state; it
continued when the great majority of the people actually appointed
shared that same political party. The failure, at least on the surface, of
the CRC members to adopt public proposals only made the mistrust
worse. When the proposals were finalized, and the public saw that almost
every proposal contained several individual amendments-an attempt,
arguably, at providing comprehensive areas of constitutional reform-
321. Id. at 149-52.
322. State ex rel. Citizens Proposition for Tax Relief v. Firestone, 386 So. 2d 561, 568
(Fla. 1980) (Sundberg, J., dissenting).
323. See, e.g., Joseph W. Little, The Need to Revise the Florida Constitutional Revision
Commission, 52 FLA. L. REV. 475, 478 (2000).
324. Gais & Benjamin, supra note 12, at 1304.
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the public reacted angrily. Accustomed to the single-subject restriction
that applies to citizens' initiatives, members of the public and newspaper
editorial-page writers accused the CRC of dishonesty. 325
The framers of Florida's constitution envisioned a CRC with complete
freedom and independence-but its brainchild has not been able to keep
that promise. In light of not only the public frustration with attempts at
constitutional reform, but also of the specific problems identified both in
structure and in practice of Florida's CRC, this Article suggests some
reforms that could help not only Florida but other state constitution
commissions or conventions be more effective and more readily accepted
by the public.
A. Selection of Members
A CRC or convention must, as a first step, have members who have
the confidence of the public. A first step would be to ensure fair
representation of the populace. 326 The current system allows the party in
charge complete control over appointees. Political disciples who care
more for partisan advancement than for the long-term good of the state
could be appointed. An official could appoint only people from one
profession or trade, or from one geographical area. Citizens from the
Florida Keys or the Florida Panhandle could find their region entirely
unrepresented. And, as has happened consistently, a CRC could be
dominated by members of one political party.
A CRC or convention should attempt to ensure bipartisanship by
requiring that its membership reflect party and non-party affiliation
patterns of the registered voters. In Florida, at the time of writing, that
breakdown would be approximately 37.4% Democratic, 35.3%
Republican, and 27.3% non-party-affiliated. 327 In contrast, the 2017-18
CRC makeup, based solely on the party affiliations of the appointing
authorities, was at least 89% Republican and no more than 11%
Democratic.328 A fairly apportioned CRC in Florida in 2017 would have
325. E.g., Editorial: Just Vote No (Except for Amendment 4), supra note 194.
326. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964) ("Mhe fundamental principle of
representative government in this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers
of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a
State.").
327. Voter Registration - By Party Affiliation, FLA. DEP'T ST., https://www.dos.my
florida.comlelections/data-statistics/voter-registration-statistics/voter-registration-monthl
y-reports/voter-registration-by-party-affiliation/ (last visited May 24, 2019).
328. It has been difficult to ascertain the party affiliation of every 2017-18 CRC member.
Therefore, these calculations presume that each appointer chose members from his own
party except that the Chief Justice, who has no party affiliation, chose three Democrats.
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had fourteen Democrats, thirteen Republicans, and ten minor-party or
non-party-affiliated members.
A fair apportionment could be required as an outcome, by allowing
the currently authorized officeholders to retain their right to choose so
long as they reach the outcome. This method, however, would require
coordination among the appointing authorities. Alternatively, a fair
apportionment could be approximated by adding minority-party
appointers from each branch, adjusting the number of appointments each
authority receives according to voter-registration patterns, and allowing
those authorities to choose their allotted number freely.
While this adjustment would solve for party affiliation, it would not
solve for geography. One solution would be to require that at least one
member be chosen from each of the twenty judicial circuits throughout
Florida. If thirty-seven members must represent twenty geographic
areas, the risk of clustering in one area would be minimized. This
method, too, would require coordination among the appointing
authorities.
Other desirable controls might be for race, gender, age, professional
background, or educational background. Interestingly, since the 1977-78
CRC women and minorities have been represented reasonably well, even
without mandates: the 1977-78 CRC had a total of five women, three
African-Americans (including one woman), and one Latino member. The
1997-98 CRC had a total of twenty-seven men and ten women; three
African-American members, including one woman; and five Latino
members, all men.329 The 2017-18 CRC had a total of twenty-two men
and fifteen women; six African-American members, of which three were
women; and five Latinx members, of which two were women. 330 While
some diversity has been accomplished voluntarily, no mechanism is in
place to assure it. A fair-apportionment scheme similar to those
mentioned by party affiliation might be a viable way to assure diversity.
The Governor's selection of the CRC Chair allows the Governor some
control over the process as the executive officer of the state. Yet the
process contains a weakness: not only may the Governor appoint a
politically like-minded Chair, which is only to be expected, but may also
See supra text accompanying note 132. The percentages set forth in the text presume three
Democrats, thirty-four Republicans, and no unaffiliated members.
329. See Commissioners & Alternates 1997-1998, FLA. ST. U.: FLA CONST. REVISION
COMM'N, https://fall.fsulawrc.com/crc/members.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
330. See Commissioners, FLA. ST. U.: CONST. REVISION COMMISSION 2017-2018 https://
crc.law.fsu.edulCommissioners.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
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appoint a Chair out of political patronage. Would a system in which the
CRC members elect the chair avoid this potential or the appearance of it?
B. Advance Preparation
Florida's CRC is built into the constitution to occur on a regular basis.
Similarly, in many states, constitutional conventions are built in at
intervals. Therefore, these occurrences, though momentous, are anything
but a surprise. They can be planned for. And, if they are to be an effective
use of the members' time and the taxpayers' money, they should be
planned for.
The best example of CRC planning in Florida's history is the 1997-98
CRC Steering Committee. The Governor, nearly one year before the CRC
would convene, created by executive order a Steering Committee
composed of the appointing authorities (with the exception that, instead
of the Governor, the Governor's General Counsel attended and was
Chair) and the Attorney General. 331 The group met regularly. 332 It set up
a tentative set of rules, ensured the Legislature allotted money for the
CRC, and tentatively decided what the committees should be. 333 The
result was that when it was time for the CRC to begin, it had at least a
tentative structure in place. In contrast, in both 1977 and 2017, the CRC
members took their seats with little to no planning having been done.334
In 1977, because the timing of the CRC itself was in question and the
subject of a governor's request to the Florida Supreme Court for an
advisory opinion, planning was difficult.335 In 2017, no reason existed to
not plan.
Planning is better. At least CRC or convention members can have a
place from which to start. Even if the budget is inadequate and the rules
wrong-headed, the body has a starting point-and the benefit of a few
people invested in the process who have had months to think about it.
331. Exec. Order No. 96-194 (Fla. 1996).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46; Interview with Sherry Plymale, supra
note 186; Interview with Jacqui Thurlow-Lippisch, Member, Const. Revision Comm'n
2017-18, and Carolyn Timmann, Member, Const. Revision Comm'n 2017-18, in Lake
Buena Vista, Fla. (June 20, 2019).
335. See supra text accompanying note 218.
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C. Timing of the CRC or Convention
The 1997-98 CRC's agenda nearly fell apart when the Legislature
convened before the CRC had finished its job. Yes, the CRC had voted to
place matters on the ballot, but events convened to take some of those
matters right back off because powerful legislators lobbied hard for that
result. The CRC should meet at a time when the Legislature is not
meeting. Even in an era when the Legislature is active year-round and
communications are ubiquitous, it would benefit a CRC to not be actively
meeting in the capital when the Legislature is also actively meeting in
the capital.
D. Rule Creation
Constraining the CRC as to how it makes its rules-or what rules it
makes-smacks of exerting too much influence on the independence of
the CRC. Yet the examples of the 1977-78 CRC, in which proposals could
reach the ballot on a mere fifty-percent-plus-one vote of the CRC
membership and then failed to be adopted by the public,336 and the
2017-18 CRC, in which the committee-kill rule meant that most
members never got to debate most constitutional proposalS 337-give us
pause. Perhaps the CRC should be subject to a few limits on its rules, to
ensure plenary debate on every proposal. After all, the CRC does not exist
to pass laws, as a Legislature does. It exists to review and potentially
alter the fundamental organizing document of state government.
E. Approval of Proposals
Despite the universal complaining by the public and the newspaper
editorial boards about the bundling of CRC amendments, all of the seven
proposals of the 2017-18 CRC that remained on the ballot passed
comfortably by more than the 60% margin required by the Florida
Constitution. 338 Given the complaining and unpopularity, and editorials
admonishing voters to defeat the proposals, this result may seem weird
336. See Transcript of Proceedings at 368, 386, Const. Revision Comm'n (Sept. 27, 1977);
Initiatives / Amendments / Revisions Database, FLA. DIVISION ELECTIONS, https://
dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
337. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55.
338. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(e); Initiatives / Amendments / Revisions Database, FLA.
DIvISlON ELECTIONS, https://dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/ (last visited May 25,
2019).
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for anyone who had been paying attention in Florida during the summer
and fall of 2018. Should constitutional amendments be required to pass,
not only by the overall 60% margin, but also by a wide geographical array
of voters? Would sixty percent approval from each congressional district
ensure that all Floridians, broadly speaking, actually approved an
amendment? Or, more granular still, 60% approval from each of the
twenty judicial circuits? The answer can lie only in the soul of a state.
Does it honor the wishes of its citizens in numbers primarily, in
accordance with Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims? Or does it demand
that all regions approve, more apposite to the Electoral College?
F. Judicial Review: Create Time Schedule and Restrict Scope
Although the Florida Constitution contains no provision that would
give courts the power to review the CRC's work, Florida's trial and
appellate courts have assumed jurisdiction anyhow. Because that is
already the case, Florida's constitution should provide rules for timing of
court challenges and for jurisdiction, perhaps restricting the scope of
judicial review over the work of a CRC.
G. Combining Proposals
It seems that a CRC should retain the ability to make comprehensive
constitutional reform. But this kind of reform needs an understanding by
the populace. As Kogan, Gais, and Benjamin have explained, voters tend
to approve single-subject amendments and reject more comprehensive
reform. 339 In Florida in 2018, the ability of the CRC to bundle and
combine related proposals was specifically questioned in lawsuits. 340 Yet,
the only readily available alternative is citizens' initiatives, which must
be only about a single subject, leaving the CRC (and Florida's Taxation
and Budget Reform Commission) as the only alternative to the
Legislature or a full-blown convention. How can this gap be bridged? Can
a campaign of public information designed to explain comprehensive
constitutional reform help the public to gain confidence in future CRCs
or conventions? Perhaps that end is worth pursuing.
339. Kogan, supra note 40, at 891; Gais & Benjamin, supra note 12, at 1291.
340. E.g., Detzner v. Anstead, 256 So. 3d 820, 823 (Fla. 2018) (per curiam).
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H. Should the CRC Be Restricted to a Defined Standard as to What Is
"Constitutional"?
Another point of resistance by the public to the work of the CRC has
been the complaint that the proposals are simply policy items more suited
to the work of a Legislature than to a CRC or convention. 341 Perhaps the
CRC should be presented with a set of standards setting out the
difference between what is "constitutional" and what is merely
"legislative." Or, perhaps Florida could siphon off some of the citizens'
desired policy reforms by creating a citizens' initiative to pass statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
Constitution revision commissions have great potential as tools for
comprehensive constitutional reform. Yet, as the Florida example shows,
the very freedom and amorphousness of a plenary CRC can get in the
way of its effectiveness. Restrictions that would ensure its political
independence, though paradoxical in principle, may be a way to save the
CRC and improve its effectiveness.
341. See e.g., 1/26/18 Constitution Revision Commission Ethics and Elections
Committee, FLA. CHANNEL, https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/1-26-18-constitution-
revision-commission-ethics-elections-committee/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
1231

